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A B S T R A C T
After surveying classical results, we introduce a generalized notion of inference
system to support structural recursion on non-well-founded data types. Besides
axioms and inference rules with the usual meaning, a generalized inference
system allows coaxioms, which are, intuitively, axioms which can only be applied
“at infinite depth” in a proof tree. This notion nicely subsumes standard
inference systems and their inductive and coinductive interpretation, while
providing more flexibility. Indeed, the classical results can be extended to our
generalized framework, interpreting recursive definitions as fixed points which
are not necessarily the least, nor the greatest one. This allows formal reasoning
in cases where the inductive and coinductive interpretation do not provide the
intended meaning, or are mixed together.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Induction is the fundamental building block of a large part of both mathemat-
ics and computer science. We can mention a number of examples. Peano’s
arithmetic has among its axioms an induction principle. Go¨del’s recursive
functions can be constructed in an inductive way and this feature is crucial
to increase the expressiveness of the theory. Orders satisfying the descending
chain condition enjoy the well-founded induction principle that is widely used
in commutative and computer algebra. In formal language theory grammars
are inductive structures and operational semantics of programming languages
are usually defined in an inductive way. In addition, almost every programming
language supports in some form a notion of inductive definitions of types
and/or functions, and especially in declarative paradigms this is essential to
write non-trivial programs. These are only few examples of the presence of
induction in mathematics and computer science; it is so important, widely used
and well-established that it is taught since the early years of any degree in such
fields.
Induction allows us to define structures, i.e., data types, and provides a
powerful and natural (in the sense that it is driven by the definition) reasoning
style to deal with such structures. Usually inductive definitions are formulated
through rules that state under which hypotheses the judgement we are defining
is valid. Let us consider an example: probably the most well-known one is the
inductive definition of natural numbers reported below:
0 : Nat
n : Nat
s(n) : Nat
Here we are defining the judgement n : Nat that says ”n is a natural number”.
The above definition can be read in this way: 0 is a natural number, and, if n is
a natural number, then s(n) is also a natural number.
When the defining judgement, like the previous one, describes a data type,
we can read the definition from another point of view: we can say that it shows
how we can build objects of that type using some constructors, in the above
example 0 and s(−). This means that all natural numbers are built starting from
0 and repeatedly (zero or more finitely many times) applying the successor
constructor s(−).
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As mentioned before, one of the strengths of inductive definitions is that they
induce a natural reasoning style. Indeed, following the rule structure we derive
a powerful proof principle: if we want to prove that a predicate P is satisfied
by all the judgements valid in the inductive definition, we can just consider
each rule separately, assume that P holds for every premise and prove that it
holds also for the consequence of that rule. For instance, in the case of natural
numbers, we get the following proof principle.
Given a predicate P, it holds for any natural number n if we prove
P(0), and, for each n, P(s(n)) assuming P(n), as formalized below:
P(0) ∀n : Nat. P(n)⇒ P(s(n))
∀n : Nat. P(n)
Another typical example of inductively defined data type are finite lists. We
start from a given type A and denote by List(A) the type of finite lists with
elements of type A, defined as follows:
Λ : List(A)
x : A l : List(A)
x::l : List(A)
This definition can be read as follows: Λ (the empty list) is a list, and, if x is an
element of type A and l is a list, then x::l is a list. Here the constructors are Λ
and −::− and again each list is built starting from Λ and applying finitely many
times the constructor −::−, that is, a typical list has shape x1::x2::. . .::xn::Λ. The
induction principle associated to this data type is the following.
Given a predicate P, it holds for any list lif we prove P(Λ), and,
for each list l and element x, P(x::l) assuming P(l), as formalized
below:
P(Λ) ∀l : List(A). ∀x : A. P(l)⇒ P(x::l)
∀l : List(A). P(l)
Again the structure of this proof principle is guided by the structure of
the data type. Following this structure we can also define other judgements
involving inductively defined data types. For instance, for lists, we can define
the predicate member(x, l) that states that the element x appears in the list l.
Here we abstract from the type of the elements since it is not relevant. The
definition is given by the following rules
member(x, x::l)
member(y, l)
member(y, x::l)
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and states that the head of a list belongs to the list itself, and, if x belongs to
the tail of a list, it also belongs to the whole list. The definition is correct since
intuitively x belongs to l if and only if removing iteratively the head of the list,
in finitely many times we find x, that is, we find a list x::l′.
In these simple examples we find a common feature: everything is in some
sense finite. More precisely, in an inductive definition a judgement is valid if
we reach a base case (rules with no premises) in finitely many times. In this
situation we say that the definition or the data type is well-founded. We will
make this more precise in Chapter 3 where we will present inductive definitions
in a rigorous way.
Beside induction there is another more mysterious pattern: coinduction, that is
in some sense dual to induction. Coinduction is less well-known than induction,
however in many cases coinductive reasoning is very useful, notably when
dealing with non-well-founded or circular structures such as graphs, infinite
lists, infinite trees, etc.
A coinductive definition shows how objects can be observed through destructors,
so the focus is more on the behaviour than on the structure. For this reason, in
literature coinduction has been firstly used to reason about the behaviour of
concurrent and non-deterministic systems, in particular on bisimilarity (Milner,
1980; Milner et al., 1992). The focus on dynamics and behaviour of systems is
present also when the perspective on coinduction is more abstract and general
(Aczel, 1988; Rutten, 2000).
Let us consider an example of coinductive definition of a data type. We
define the type of streams, which are infinite sequences of elements of a given
type. The definition is again expressed using rules but the interpretation is very
different.
x : A s : Stream(A)
x::s : Stream(A)
This definition is very similar to that of lists, indeed streams are also called
infinite lists, but there is no base case; thus interpreting it inductively makes no
sense, because an inductive definition requires to reach a base case in finitely
many steps, that is clearly not possible in this case. Coinduction allows infinitely
many steps, so a base case is not necessary and we can build infinite sequences
of elements of type A.
As already mentioned, in coinductive definitions the focus is more on the
behaviour, that is, on how we can decompose the structure we are defining.
Destructors are not explicit in the rules, but can be derived by reading rules
bottom-up: in the example, starting from a stream s, there always exist an
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element x (the head) and a stream s′ (the tail) such that s = x::s′. So we can
define destructors head(s) and tail(s) that given a stream s observe its head
and its tail, respectively. Note that such destructors could not be defined on
finite lists, since we are not guaranteed that every list has a head and a tail. In
particular the empty list, that is the base case, has neither a head nor a tail.
Like for inductive definitions, associated to coinductive ones there is a proof
principle. It is not easy to express such principle in an informal way, probably
due to the less spread and popularity of this definition and reasoning style. An
attempt to formulate the coinduction principle in an informal way is done in
(Kozen and Silva, 2016), but we are still far from a natural informal explanation.
It is common practice to state coinduction principles referring to the particular
framework in which one works (category theory, type theory, set theory, etc.),
so we postpone this aspect to Chapter 3 where we will introduce the formal
framework we have chosen.
Again like for inductive definitions, we can exploit the structure of a coin-
ductively defined data type in order to define more complex judgements. For
instance, the rules for the predicate member(x, l) given for the data type of lists
work also for streams. Note that in this case the data type is coinductive while
the predicate definition is inductive. Indeed, induction is enough, since, in
order to establish whether this predicate holds, we need to inspect only finitely
many elements of the stream. Instead, if we need to inspect the whole stream,
that is, we need infinitely many steps, a coinductive definition is necessary. For
instance, considering streams over integers, the predicate allPos(s), that holds if
all the elements in s are positive, must be defined coinductively as follows:
allPos(s)
allPos(x::s)
x > 0
where the side condition specifies that the rule applies only when x is a strictly
positive integer.
We have briefly described the two dual ways in which recursive definitions
can be interpreted. However, there are cases in which neither induction nor
coinduction precisely capture the intended semantics of the definition, especially
when we are defining more complex judgements on coinductive data types
exploiting their structure. Roughly speaking, the problem is that inductive
definitions are too strict for dealing with non-well-founded data types, but
coinductive definitions are too weak: they consider too many judgements as
valid. So there is the need to make the interpretation of definitions more flexible,
overcoming the dichotomy between induction and coinduction.
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In the present thesis we address this problem: we choose a particular formal
framework in which to express (co)inductive definitions and extend it in order
to support more flexible interpretations. This extension has been inspired by
some works on operational semantics of language constructs for corecursive
definitions of predicates and functions (Ancona, 2013; Ancona and Zucca, 2012,
2013). The first motivating idea has been to develop an abstract framework for
better understanding such operational models and providing a more abstract
semantics in order to allow formal reasoning on them.
This thesis is an extended version of the work we have done in (Ancona et al.,
2017b) and is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we briefly report some standard
and well-known notions from lattice theory, a general mathematical theory,
studying structures induced by partial orders, that will be useful to define the
semantics of our framework. In Chapter 3 we introduce the notion of inference
system and explain its syntax and semantics. This framework is based on the
notion of inference rule that allows us to talk about (co)inductive definitions in a
very intuitive way, having at the same time a precise and quite simple formal
semantics. Results presented in this chapter are standard, however some parts
of the presentation are, at the best of our knowledge, original. In particular,
since we did not find in literature a rigorous enough treatment of the proof-
theoretic semantics of inference systems, we have developed it autonomously.
The key notions are those of tree and graph presented in Section 3.1.1, where
we prove Theorem 3.1, that allows us to give a new proof of the equivalence
between proof-theoretic and fixed point semantics in the coinductive case (see
Section 3.2.2).
In Chapter 4 we develop an extension of inference systems, both in syntax
and semantics, built on the notion of coaxioms, that are particular rules used to
control the semantics of the whole definition. We define both a model-theoretic
and a proof-theoretic semantics for coaxioms. The former is based on the new
notion of bounded fixed point and the latter on standard and newly defined
approximated proof trees. We also present proof techniques to reason with
coaxioms and several examples of applications. This chapter presents in a
more detailed and complete way the notions and results in (Ancona et al.,
2017b). Notably, we have discussed in more detail concepts related to closures
and kernels, in order to better frame the bounded fixed point in lattice theory.
Furthermore, we have provided a better proof-theoretic characterization of the
interpretation generated by coaxioms (Theorem 4.8), thanks to a more formal
treatment of proof trees. We have also considered further examples to show the
effectiveness of coaxioms.
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Finally, in Chapter 5 we summarize related work and in Chapter 6 we
conclude the work, also discussing further developments.
2
T O P I C S I N L AT T I C E T H E O RY
Lattice theory (Nation, 1998) is a well-established mathematical framework widely
used both in mathematics and in computer science, especially for studying
semantics. The subject of this theory is a particular class of partially ordered sets
with a rich algebraic structure. Indeed lattices arise very frequently in various
branches of both mathematics (algebra, topology, logic, etc.) and computer
science (semantics of programming languages, formal verification, abstract
interpretation, etc.).
In this framework semantics is usually expressed as a fixed point of a function
that depends on the language1 we are studying. From this point of view, an
important quality of lattice theory is that it provides a good expressiveness,
yet keeping the theory quite simple: it allows to assign a semantics to a broad
class of recursive definitions using elementary mathematical tools. However
usually, in order to reason about the semantics of programs, more powerful and
complex frameworks are adopted, for instance, in the order-theoretic setting,
domain theory (Abramsky and Jung, 1994) is often used. It has been shown
in (Scott, 1980) that objects studied by domain theory are able to capture the
semantics of the λ-calculus, thus of every computable function. Hence, in order
to deal with complete languages, domain theory is the right choice. However,
for our aims, lattices are powerful enough, since we will deal with inference
systems, that allow us to develop a simpler theory.
In this chapter we will summarize some standard and well-known notions
and results about lattices, in order to be self-contained, providing all necessary
concepts for understanding our work. We will mainly discuss complete lattices
that are the structure we need in the rest of the thesis, and in particular we will
focus on fixed point theorems, that is, on theorems that ensure the existence
and/or give a characterization of fixed points of particular classes of functions.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we introduce the notion of
partial order and monotone function that are the elementary bricks of lattice
theory. In Section 2.2 we introduce lattices as an algebraic structure, we provide
a canonical way to turn a lattice into a partially ordered set and introduce the
1 This term is used here in a very broad sense, it does not necessarily indicate a language defined
by a formal syntax.
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notion of complete lattice. Section 2.3 is devoted to the first and most important
fixed point theorem: the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem (Tarski, 1955). In
Section 2.4 we discuss the notion of continuity from the order-theoretic point of
view, and, relying on it, we give an alternative characterization of fixed points
of continuous functions.
2.1 partial orders and monotone functions
In this section we will introduce some basic concepts from order theory, fixing
a uniform notation for the the rest of the thesis. We will assume basic notions
from set theory (set, relation, function, elementary set constructions etc.) and
we will generally use an infix notation for binary relations and operations.
Definition 2.1. Given a set P, a binary relation v on P is a partial order if it
satisfies the following properties:
reflexivity for all x ∈ P, x v x
antisymmetry for all x, y ∈ P, if x v y and y v x then x = y
transitivity for all x, y, z ∈ P, if x v y and y v z, then x v z
A pair (P, v) where P is a set and v is a partial order on P is called partially
ordered set or simply poset.
The most well-known example of partial order is standard set inclusion.
Indeed for any set X the pair (℘(X), ⊆) is a poset:
reflexivity for all A ∈ ℘(X), A ⊆ A trivially
antisymmetry for all A, B ∈ ℘(X), A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A implies A = B by the
extensionality axiom
transitivity for all A, B, C ∈ ℘(X), A ⊆ B and B ⊆ C implies A ⊆ C since
for each x ∈ A, x ∈ B by A ⊆ B and then x ∈ C by B ⊆ C
Starting from this partial order we can build other orders, for instance con-
sidering algebraic structures on sets. We consider as an example the group
structure, but analogous definitions can be given for every algebraic structure.
A group is a triple (G, ·, 1), where G is a set with a binary operation · that is
associative, that is
∀x, y, z ∈ G. (x · y) · z = x · (y · z)
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and 1 ∈ is an identity for ·, that is
∀x ∈ G. x · 1 = 1 · x = x
In addition every element x ∈ G is required to have an inverse with respect to ·,
that is
∀x ∈ G. ∃x−1 ∈ G. x · x−1 = x−1 · x = 1
A subset H ⊆ G is a subgroup of G if (H, ·, 1) is a group. We denote by Sub(G)
the set of all subgroups of G. Clearly Sub(G) ⊆ ℘(G), thus (Sub(G), ⊆) is a
poset.
This last statement is actually a particular instance of a general property of
posets, indeed if (P, v) is a poset and Q ⊆ P, then the restriction vQ of v to Q
is a partial order on Q.
Let us note that if (P, v) is a partially ordered set, then we can consider the
dual ordering w, that makes (P, w) a poset. We will rely on this observation in
the following, avoiding to give the dual of several definitions, assuming that
these definitions are the same yet given in the dual ordering.
Let us now fix some terminology.
Definition 2.2. Let (P, v) be a partially ordered set. Then:
1. A subset A ⊆ P is a lower set if for all x ∈ A and y ∈ P, y v x implies
y ∈ A. The dual notion is named upper set.
2. Given a subset A ⊆ P, the lower set generated by A is the intersection of
all lower sets X ⊆ P such that A ⊆ X, and is denoted by ↓ A. Dually the
upper set generated by A is denoted by ↑ A. If A = {x} then we will write
↓ x and ↑ x.
3. Given a subset A ⊆ P, an element x ∈ P is an upper bound of A if, for all
y ∈ A, y v x. We denote by ub(A) the set of upper bounds of A. The dual
notion is named lower bound and lb(A) denotes the set of all lower bounds
of A.
4. Given a subset A ⊆ P, x ∈ A is a bottom (least) element of A if, for all y ∈ A,
x v y. The dual notion is named top (greatest) element. If A = P usually
bottom and top elements are denoted by ⊥ and >, respectively.
5. Given a subset A ⊆ P, the least upper bound or join of A is the bottom
element of ub(A) and is denoted by
⊔
A. The greatest lower bound or meet
is defined dually and denoted by
d
A.
10 topics in lattice theory
When A = {x1, . . . , xn}, we will often write lb(x1, . . . , xn) and ub(x1, . . . , xn),
omitting curly braces. Below we report some trivial facts that point out the
behaviour of concepts introduced in Definition 2.2 and the relationships among
them.
• Given A ⊆ P and x ∈ P, we have
↓ x = {y ∈ P | y v x} ↑ x = {y ∈ P | x v y}
↓ A = ⋃
a∈A
↓ a ↑ A = ⋃
a∈A
↑ a
lb(A) =
⋂
a∈A
↓ a ub(A) = ⋂
a∈A
↑ a
• Given A ⊆ P, the least and the greatest elements of A, if they exist, are
unique, and thus the least upper bound and greatest lower bound of A
are unique too.
• Given A ⊆ B ⊆ P, we have ⊔ A v ⊔ B and d B v d A
• Given A ⊆ P, if A = ⋃ Ai for i ∈ I, thenl
A =
l
i∈I
l
Ai
⊔
A =
⊔
i∈I
⊔
Ai
Let us now introduce another fundamental notion. Every time we study a
mathematical structure, at some point we have to talk about maps preserving
such structure: homomorphisms. In our case, the structure is given by a partial
order, thus structure preserving maps are those that preserve the order.
Definition 2.3. Let (P, vP) and
(
Q, vQ
)
be partially ordered sets. A function
F : P→ Q is monotone if, for all x, y ∈ P, x vP y implies F(x) vQ F(y).
We will always omit subscripts when they are clear from the context. We can
find several examples of monotone functions.
1. Considering the poset (℘(A), ⊆) for a given set A, the function f :
℘(A)→ ℘(A) given by f (X) = X ∪ C with C ∈ ℘(A) is clearly monotone
since if X ⊆ Y then X ∪ C ⊆ Y ∪ C.
2. Considering the poset (N, ≤) of natural numbers with the usual total
ordering, the successor function (n 7→ n + 1), the multiplication by a
constant k ∈N (n 7→ kn) and the factorial (n 7→ n!) are monotone.
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3. Considering two groups G1 and G2, a group homomorphism is a function
f : G1 → G2 such that, for all x, y ∈ G1, f (x · y) = f (x) · f (y). With
an abuse of notation we denote by f (X) the image of X, that is, the set
{ f (x) | x ∈ X} where X ⊆ G1. It is easy to see that if H ∈ Sub(G1) then
f (H) ∈ Sub(G2), indeed f (1) = 1, so 1 ∈ f (H), and if f (x), f (y) ∈ f (H)
then f (x) · f (y) = f (x · y) ∈ f (H) and finally if f (x) ∈ f (H), f (x)−1 =
f (x−1) ∈ f (H). Therefore the map f : Sub(G1)→ Sub(G2) is well-defined
and is clearly monotone.
As usual we define isomorphisms between posets (P, v) and (Q, v) as mono-
tone functions F : P→ Q which have an inverse, that is, a monotone function
F−1 : Q → P such that F ◦ F−1 = idQ and F−1 ◦ F = idP. We can equivalently
characterize isomorphisms as follows.
Proposition 2.1. A monotone function F : P → Q is an isomorphism iff it is
surjective and, for all x, y ∈ P, x v y iff F(x) v F(y).
Proof. (⇒). Since F is an isomorphism it is bijective and so surjective. Since F is
monotone, for all x, y ∈ P, if x v y then F(x) v F(y), so we have only to show
the reverse implication. But if F(x) v F(y), F−1(F(x)) v F−1(F(y)) since F−1 is
monotone; hence x v y.
(⇐). We have only to show that F is injective and its inverse is monotone. If
F(x) = F(y), then F(x) v F(y) and F(y) v F(x), this implies that x v y and
y v x and so by antisymmetry we get x = y, that shows F to be injective. Since
F is also surjective, it has an inverse F−1 : Q→ P. To show that F−1 is monotone
we consider x, y ∈ Q such that x v y. By surjectivity of F there are x′, y′ ∈ P
such that x = F(x′) and y = F(y′), hence by hypothesis we get x′ v y′, that
shows the thesis.
2.2 semilattices, lattices and complete lattices
In this section we will introduce richer structures involving partial orders. In
particular we will consider algebraic structures having a natural ordering with
good properties. These structures are semilattices, lattices and complete lattices.
Definition 2.4. A pair (L, ?), where L is a set and ? is a binary operation on it,
is a semilattice if the following properties hold:
idempotence for all x ∈ L, x ? x = x
commutativity for all x, y ∈ L, x ? y = y ? x
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associativity for all x, y, z ∈ L, (x ? y) ? z = x ? (y ? z)
In other words, a semilattice is an idempotent commutative semigroup. A
natural example of semilattice is the pair (℘(X), ∩) where the binary operation
is set intersection. Analogously the pair (℘(X), ∪) is also a semilattice with set
union as binary operation.
As mentioned above, we are interested in algebraic structures with a natural
ordering, so let us introduce such ordering for semilattices. Given a semilattice
(L, ?), for each x, y ∈ L we define
x v y⇐⇒ x ? y = x
Then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2.1. Let (L, ?) be a semilattice, then (L, v) is a partially ordered set
where each pair of elements x, y ∈ L has a greatest lower bound.
Proof. We have to show that v verifies axioms of partial orders.
reflexivity for all x ∈ L, x v x since x ? x = x by idempotence
antisymmetry for all x, y ∈ L, if x v y and y v x, we have x ? y = x and
y ? x = y, then by commutativity we get x = x ? y = y ? x = y as needed
transitivity for all x, y, z ∈ L, if x v y and y v z, we have x ? y = x and
y ? z = y, hence x ? z = (x ? y) ? z = x ? (y ? z) = x ? y = x by associativity,
thus x v z
Let us now consider two elements x, y ∈ L, we will show that x ? y is the greatest
lower bound of {x, y}. First we show that x ? y ∈ lb(x, y), i.e., x ? y v x and
x ? y v y. Indeed (x ? y) ? y = x ? (y ? y) = x ? y that shows x ? y v y. The
other inequality can be shown analogously.
Now we have to show that x ? y is the greatest element of lb(x, y). So let
z ∈ lb(x, y), then z v x and z v y, that is, z ? x = z and z ? y = z. Hence
z ? (x ? y) = (z ? x) ? y = z ? y = z as needed.
Semilattices with this ordering are usually called meet semilattices and the
binary operation is denoted by u.
We can show also the converse of Theorem 2.1, that is, we can build a
semilattice starting from a partial order where each pair of elements has a meet.
Theorem 2.2. Let (L, v) be a partially ordered set where each pair of elements
x, y ∈ L has a greatest lower bound, say x u y. Then, (L, u) is a semilattice.
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Proof. We have to show that the operation u satisfies axioms of semilattices.
idempotence for all x ∈ L, x u x = x since lb(x) = ↓ x that has as largest
element x itself
commutativity for all x, y ∈ L, x u y = y u x since for the lower bound the
order of the elements does not matter
associativity for all x, y, z ∈ L, (x u y) u z = x u (y u z) sincel
{x, y} u z =
l
{x, y, z} = x u
l
{y, z}
Analogous definitions can be given considering the dual ordering
x v y⇐⇒ x ? y = y
In this case (L, v) is a poset where each pair of elements has a least upper
bound. These semilattices are usually called join semilattices and the binary
operation is called join.
Relying on Theorem 2.2, from now on we will denote the greatest lower
bound and the least upper bound of {x, y} by respectively x u y and x unionsq y.
Combining a meet semilattice and a join semilattice in a proper way we get a
lattice.
Definition 2.5. A triple (L, u, unionsq) is a lattice if
1. (L, u) is a meet semilattice
2. (L, unionsq) is a join semilattice
3. for all x, y ∈ L, x u (x unionsq y) = x and x unionsq (x u y) = x
The last conditions, called abstraction laws, are needed in order to ensure that
orderings induced by the join and the meet semilattice structures agree with
each other. More precisely, abstraction laws imply the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. If (L, u, unionsq) is a lattice, then x u y = y iff x unionsq y = y.
Proof. (⇒) If x u y = x, then x unionsq y = (x u y) unionsq y = y by the second abstraction
law. (⇐) If x unionsq y = y, then x u y = x u (x unionsq y) = x by the first abstraction
law.
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Thus a lattice (L, u, unionsq) has a unique natural ordering. We can state a theorem
analogous to Theorem 2.2 that allows us to build a lattice from a partially
ordered set where each pair of elements has both a meet and a join.
The most natural example of lattice is given by the triple (℘(X), ∩, ∪) of all
subsets of a given set X with set intersection and union.
Let us now introduce the notion of completeness. We start defining a complete
lattice.
Definition 2.6. A non-empty partially ordered set (L, v) is a complete lattice if
every non-empty subset A ⊆ L has both least upper bound ⊔ A and greatest
lower bound
d
A.
Clearly, a complete lattice is a lattice where for all x, y ∈ L, x u y = d{x, y}
and x unionsq y = ⊔{x, y}. In addition, note that a complete lattice has both a top
and a bottom element, namely, > = ⊔ L and ⊥ = dL. Therefore we can define
least upper bound and greatest lower bound also for the empty set as follows:⊔
∅ = ⊥ and d∅ = >. Again an example of complete lattice is the power set
of a given set X with set inclusion (℘(X), ⊆).
Another important and immediate property of a complete lattice (L, v) is
that, for each x ∈ L, both ↑ x and ↓ x are complete lattices with the same meet
and join operations as L.
Actually requiring the existence of either the least upper bound or the greatest
lower bound of every subset is enough to turn a partially ordered set into a
complete lattice, since these notions are closely related.
Theorem 2.3. A partially ordered set (L, v) such that every subset A ⊆ L has a
least upper bound
⊔
A is a complete lattice.
Proof. Note that L is not empty, since ⊥ = ⊔∅ ∈ L. We define d A = ⊔ lb(A).
Clearly by definition
d
A is an upper bound of lb(A), so it is enough to show
that
d
A ∈ lb(A) to prove that it is the greatest lower bound of A.
By definition, for every set X ⊆ L, ⊔X is the least element of ub(X), hence⊔
lb(A) is the least element of ub(lb(A)). Therefore, for all x ∈ ub(lb(A)),⊔
lb(A) v x. By definition of lb(A) every x ∈ A is an upper bound of lb(A),
that is, A ⊆ ub(lb(A)). Thus d A = ⊔ lb(A) v x for all x ∈ A, namely,d
A ∈ lb(A).
Obviously a dual construction can be done if greatest lower bounds exist
for every subset A ⊆ L. Note that Theorem 2.3 requires the existence of the
least upper bound for every subset, namely, also for the empty set. This is
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equivalent to require that the partially ordered set has a bottom element, and
every non-empty subset has least upper bound.
Consider for instance a group G, we already know that (Sub(G), ⊆) is a
partial order, we will show that it is a complete lattice.
First of all we show that, given a family (Hi)i∈I ⊆ Sub(G) of subgroups of G,
the intersection H =
⋂
i∈I Hi is a subgroup of G. Indeed:
• 1 ∈ H since 1 ∈ Hi for all i ∈ I, because they are subgroups
• if x, y ∈ H, then for all i ∈ I, x, y ∈ Hi, and since they are subgroups,
x · y ∈ Hi, hence x · y ∈ H
• if x ∈ H, then x ∈ Hi for all i ∈ I, and since they are subgroups there is
an inverse x−1 ∈ Hi, hence x−1 ∈ H
This shows that H ∈ Sub(G). Clearly this operation computes the greatest lower
bound of the family (Hi), thus from Theorem 2.3 (Sub(G), ⊆) is a complete
lattice.
Finally we note that meet and join operations in Sub(G) are different from
those in ℘(G), indeed given a set X ⊆ Sub(G) we havel
X =
⋂
X
⊔
X =
⋂{H ∈ Sub(G) | ⋃X ⊆ H}
In other words
⊔
X is the subgroup generated by
⋃
X.
We conclude this section presenting a result that shows how a monotone
function acts on meets and joins of subsets of a complete lattice. We fix the
following notation: given a function f : A→ B, and X ⊆ A, we denote by f (X)
the set { f (x) ∈ B | x ∈ X}.
Proposition 2.3. Let (L, v) and (L′, v′) be complete lattices, F : L→ L′ be a
monotone function and X ⊆ L. The following facts hold:
1.
⊔
F(X) v′ F(⊔X)
2. F(
d
X) v′ dF(X)
Proof. We prove only 1, the proof for 2 is symmetric. First note that, for all
x ∈ X, we have x v ⊔X. Hence by monotonicity we get that F(x) v′ F(⊔X),
so F(
⊔
X) is an upper bound of F(X). Therefore by definition of least upper
bound we get
⊔
F(X) v′ F(⊔X).
We present the above result for complete lattices in order not to care about the
existence of meet and join. Actually this result holds in any partially ordered
set provided that the needed least upper bounds and greatest lower bounds
exist.
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2.3 a fixed point theorem
In this section we will analyse properties of monotone functions defined over
a complete lattice. In particular we will state and prove the Knaster-Tarski
theorem (Tarski, 1955), that is the fundamental mathematical foundation of the
whole thesis.
We start introducing the notions we deal with in this section.
Definition 2.7. Let (P, v) be a partially ordered set and F : P→ P a monotone
function. Consider an element x ∈ P, then
• x is a pre-fixed point if F(x) v x
• x is a post-fixed point if x v F(x)
• x is a fixed point if F(x) = x
We will denote by pre(F), post(F) and fix(F) the subsets of P of respectively
pre-fixed, post-fixed and fixed points of F.
Note that, thanks to the antisymmetry of the order relation, F(x) = x is
equivalent to F(x) v x and x v F(x), thus a fixed point is a point that is both
pre-fixed and post-fixed. This implies that properties valid for either post-fixed
or pre-fixed points also hold for fixed points.
The first observation we do concerns the restriction of a monotone function.
Proposition 2.4. Let (P, v) be a partially ordered set and F : P→ P a mono-
tone function on P. Consider x ∈ P, then
1. if x is pre-fixed, then F : ↓ x → ↓ x is well-defined and monotone
2. if x is post-fixed, then F : ↑ x → ↑ x is well-defined and monotone
Proof. We prove only point 1, the other is symmetric. We have to show that F
maps ↓ x into itself, that is, for each z ∈ ↓ x, F(z) ∈ ↓ x. This is straightforward
noting that z ∈ ↓ x means z v x, thus F(z) v F(x) and, since x is pre-fixed,
F(x) v x. Therefore by transitivity of v we get F(z) v x, that is, F(z) ∈ ↓ x.
The monotonicity follows immediately by hypothesis.
We now study the structure of pre(F) and post(F) when F is defined over
a complete lattice (L, v). Surely they are partially ordered with the same
ordering as L, indeed this fact holds also when L is simply a poset, but what
about the lattice structure and the completeness? The following proposition
shows that if L is complete, then we have a least upper bound or greatest lower
bound operation on these sets.
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Proposition 2.5. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice and F : L → L a monotone
function. The following facts hold:
1. if X ⊆ pre(F) then dX ∈ pre(F), that is, dX is a pre-fixed point
2. if X ⊆ post(F) then ⊔X ∈ post(F), that is, ⊔X is a post-fixed point
Proof. We only prove the first statement, the proof for the second is symmetric.
Consider a subset X ⊆ pre(F), so every x ∈ X is pre-fixed, that is, F(x) v x.
Since L is complete
d
X exists, so we have only to prove that it is pre-fixed.
Let us denote by F(X) the set {F(x) | x ∈ X}. By definition of greatest
lower bound (Definition 2.2) we have that, for each x ∈ X, dX v x. By the
monotonicity of F we get that F(
d
X) v F(x) for each x ∈ X. In other words
F(
d
X) is a lower bound of F(X), so it is below the greatest lower bound of
F(X), namely, F(
d
X) v dF(X).
Now, since
d
F(X) is a lower bound of F(X), we get that, for each x ∈ X,d
F(X) v F(x). Thus, as x is pre-fixed, by transitivity we get dF(X) v x
for each x ∈ X, namely, dF(X) is a lower bound of X. Therefore we getd
F(X) v dX and so, by transitivity we get F(dX) v dX as needed.
Corollary 2.1. If (L, v) is a complete lattice and F : L→ L is monotone, then
both (pre(F), v) and (post(F), v) are complete lattices.
Proof. It follows immediately by Proposition 2.5 and Theorem 2.3.
Note that even if pre(F) and post(F) are complete lattices and they are con-
tained in L, they are not “sublattices”, since meet and join operations are not
exactly as those of L. Consider for instance pre(F), here the meet operation
is the same, and the join is defined as usual as
⊔
pre(F) X =
d
lb(X)pre(F) for
X ⊆ pre(F). But note that lb(X)pre(F) ⊆ lb(X) and lb(x)pre(F) 6= lb(X) in general,
thus we have that
⊔
X v ⊔pre(F) X but they are not necessarily equal. Let us
clarify this issue with an example.
Consider a group G and the poset (℘(G), ⊆). Given a subset X ⊆ G we
denote by 〈X〉 the subgroup of G generated by X, that is, the intersection of
all subgroups of G containing X. Clearly the function 〈−〉 : ℘(G) → ℘(G)
is monotone. It can be easily seen that Sub(G) = pre(〈−〉), namely, pre-fixed
points are subgroups of G.
Let us now set G = Z with the group structure given by the sum operation
with identity 0 ∈ Z, and consider subgroups 〈3〉 and 〈5〉. In Sub(Z) we
have that 〈3〉 unionsq 〈5〉 = 〈3, 5〉 = Z. However Z 6= 〈3〉 ∪ 〈5〉 since for instance
2 /∈ 〈3〉 ∪ 〈5〉. Therefore the join operation in pre(〈−〉) is different from the join
operation in ℘(Z).
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We conclude the section stating and proving the Knaster-Tarski theorem
(Tarski, 1955), that is the fundamental result on which the whole thesis relies.
Theorem 2.4 (Knaster-Tarski). Let (L, v) be a complete lattice and F : L→ L
a monotone function. Then F admits both a least and a greatest fixed point, µF
and νF respectively, with
µF =
l
pre(F) νF =
⊔
post(F)
Proof. We will prove the statement for the least fixed point, for the greatest one
the proof is symmetric. Set z =
d
pre(F). From Proposition 2.5 we know that z
is pre-fixed, so we have only to show that it is post-fixed to conclude the proof.
Since z is pre-fixed we know that F(z) v z, and since F is monotone we get
F(F(z)) v F(z), that is, F(z) is pre-fixed, so F(z) ∈ pre(F). By definition of
greatest lower bound (Definition 2.2) we get that z v F(z), namely, z is post-
fixed.
To show that z is the least fixed point, it is enough to note that an arbitrary
fixed point x is by definition a pre-fixed point, so x ∈ pre(F), and since z is the
greatest lower bound of pre(F) we get z v x.
The above theorem is of fundamental importance since it not only ensures
the existence of the least and the greatest fixed point of every monotone func-
tion, but it provides an explicit characterization of them. Moreover from this
characterization immediately follow two techniques for proving inequalities
involving µF and νF. Indeed given x ∈ L the following principles hold:
induction if x if pre-fixed, that is, F(x) v x, then µF v x
coinduction if x is post-fixed, that is, x v F(x), then x v νF
These two principles are widely used in practice, since they make much easier
proving inequalities involving least and greatest fixed points: we can completely
forget of these fixed points, because inequalities only depend on the point x
and its properties with respect to the monotone function F.
2.4 chains and continuity
In this section we will introduce the notion of continuity for functions over
partially ordered sets and we will prove a theorem giving an alternative char-
acterization of the least and the greatest fixed points when the function is
continuous.
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In order to discuss continuity we have to introduce the notion of chain in a
partially ordered set.
Definition 2.8. Let (P, v) be a partially ordered set. A subset C ⊆ P is a chain
if it is totally ordered, that is, for each x, y ∈ C, either x v y or y v x. An
ω-chain is a countable chain.
Since an ω-chain is countable, it can be indexed over natural numbers, so we
will often use the notation (xi) for ω-chains, assuming i to range over N. We
will also omit the prefix ω when it is clear from the context.
A chain (xi) is called ascending if for all i ∈ N, xi v xi+1, and it is called
descending if for all i ∈N, xi+1 v xi. Clearly an ω-chain can be either ascending
or descending depending on the choice of indexes.
Definition 2.9. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice. A function F : L→ L is called
upward continuous if for every chain C = (xi), F(
⊔
C) =
⊔
F(C), downward
continuous if for every chain C = (xi), F(
d
C) =
d
F(C).
Conditions for continuity will be also expressed as follows
F
(⊔
i∈N
xi
)
=
⊔
i∈N
F(xi) F
(l
i∈N
xi
)
=
l
i∈N
F(xi)
We have given the definition of continuous function for functions defined on
a complete lattice, actually the definition works in a more general settings: it
suffices to have a function F : P→ Q where P and Q are both partially ordered
and have least upper bounds (respectively greatest lower bounds) for ascending
(respectively. descending) chains.
Proposition 2.6. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice and F : L→ L a continuous
function, then F is monotone.
Proof. Assume that F is upward continuous, the proof for the downward case is
symmetric. Consider x, y ∈ L with x v y. The set C = {x, y} is clearly a chain,
with
⊔
C = x unionsq y = y. So we have that
F(y) = F(x unionsq y) = F(x) unionsq F(y)
and, since by definition of join F(x) v F(x) unionsq F(y), we get F(x) v F(y) as
needed.
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We conclude the section presenting and discussing another fixed point theo-
rem: the Kleene theorem. Actually this result has several names and variations,
a summary can be found in (Lassez et al., 1982), we will discuss it in the context
of complete lattices, since that is the framework in which we work.
First of all let us introduce a useful notation. Given a complete lattice (L, v),
a monotone function F : L→ L, and an element x ∈ L, we denote by IF,x the set
{Fn(x) | n ∈N} of iterative applications of F on x. The following lemma holds.
Lemma 2.1. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice and F : L→ L a monotone function.
If x ∈ L is either pre-fixed or post-fixed, then IF,x is a chain.
Proof. Assume x to be pre-fixed, the other case is symmetric. We show by
induction on n that, for all n ∈N, Fn(x) v Fn+1(x). This implies that IF,x is an
ascending chain.
If n = 0, we have F0(x) = x v F(x) since x is pre-fixed.
Assume the thesis for n, thus Fn(x) v Fn+1(x); since F is monotone, we have that
F(Fn(x)) v F(Fn+1(x)) from which we get Fn+1(x) v Fn+2(x) as needed.
In particular the lemma shows that IF,⊥ and IF,> are both chains, since ⊥ is
post-fixed and > is pre-fixed. Also the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2.2. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice and F : L→ L a monotone function.
Then the following conditions hold:
1. if
⊔
IF,⊥ is pre-fixed, then it is the least fixed point of F
2. if
d
IF,> is post-fixed, then it is the greatest fixed point of F
Proof. We prove 1, the proof for 2 is symmetric. To show that
⊔
IF,⊥ is the
least fixed point, we first prove that every pre-fixed point is an upper bound of
IF,⊥. Hence, given x ∈ pre(F), we show by induction on n that, for all n ∈ N,
Fn(⊥) v x. If n = 0, we have F0(⊥) = ⊥ v x by definition of bottom element.
Assume the thesis for n, so Fn(⊥) v x. Then by the monotonicity of F we get
Fn+1(⊥) v F(x), but since x is pre-fixed, F(x) v x, so by transitivity we get
Fn+1(⊥) v x as needed.
In other words we have proved that pre(F) ⊆ ub(IF,⊥), that implies ⊔ IF,⊥ =d
ub(IF,⊥) v
d
pre(F). However by hypothesis
⊔
IF,⊥ ∈ pre(F), hence we get
also the opposite inequality, that implies
⊔
IF,⊥ =
d
pre(F). Recall that by
Theorem 2.4 we have µF =
d
pre(F), hence
⊔
IF,⊥ = µF as needed.
We can now prove the Kleene theorem.
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Theorem 2.5 (Kleene). Let (L, v) be a complete lattice and F : L→ L a function.
Then the following conditions hold:
1. if F is upward continuous, then
⊔
IF,⊥ is the least fixed point of F
2. if F is downward continuous, then
d
IF,> is the greatest fixed point of F
Proof. We prove 1, the proof for 2 is symmetric. Since F is upward continuous
and IF,⊥ is a chain by Lemma 2.1, we get that
F
(⊔
IF,⊥
)
=
⊔
F(IF,⊥) =
⊔
n∈N
Fn+1(⊥)
Since ⊥ v Fn(⊥) for all n ∈ N, ⊥ unionsq ⊔ F(IF,⊥) = ⊔ F(IF,⊥); moreover, since
⊥ = F0(⊥), ⊥ unionsq ⊔ Fn+1(⊥) = ⊔ Fn(⊥) = ⊔ IF,⊥ for n ∈ N. Therefore we get
F(
⊔
IF,⊥) =
⊔
IF,⊥, namely, it is a fixed point.
In particular
⊔
IF,⊥ is pre-fixed, hence by Lemma 2.2 we get that it is the least
fixed point.
An important consequence of this theorem is that it provides another way to
prove the same inequalities that we can prove with induction and coinduction
principles presented in Section 2.3. Indeed, assuming that F is continuous in
the appropriate sense, we have the following proof principles:
• for all x ∈ L, if, for all n ∈ N, Fn(⊥) v x implies Fn+1(⊥) v x, then
µF v x
• for all x ∈ L, if,s for all n ∈ N, x v Fn(⊥) implies x v Fn+1(⊥), then
x v νF
These principles only require a proof by arithmetic induction and do not impose
any constraint on the element x, while induction and coinduction principles
require it to be pre-fixed or post-fixed. The correctness of these principles is
trivial: they say in other words that if x is an upper bound (respectively. a
lower bound) of the chain IF,⊥ (respectively. IF,>) its least upper bound
⊔
IF,⊥
(respectively. its greatest lower bound
d
IF,>) is below (respectively. above) x.
This looks like a great simplification with respect to induction and coinduc-
tion, however we have an additional hypothesis: F must be continuous and this
is not easy to prove in practice.

3
A F R A M E W O R K F O R R E C U R S I V E D E F I N I T I O N S
In the introduction we have discussed inductive and coinductive definitions
in an informal way. We have represented them by means of rules, that relate
premises to a consequence in a recursive way, that is, the shape of the judgement
in the consequence is the same of those in premises. We have used rules since
they provide a very intuitive understanding of (recursive) definitions, even if
we have not described yet their precise semantics.
In this chapter we discuss in a rigorous way rule-based definitions, following
the framework introduced in (Aczel, 1977) and become very popular: the theory
of inference systems. This framework is widely used in several fields: in program-
ming languages, operational semantics and type systems are usually expressed
through an inference system, in mathematical logic the logical consequence
relation is also usually defined using rules and in type theory rules to define
and manipulate types are again often expressed in this way.
The notions and results we will introduce in this chapter are all standard
and are aimed to assign a formal meaning to concepts, such as definition, rule,
inductive and coinductive interpretation, and several others, that form the
framework we will use for the rest of this work.
Although, as we said, this chapter presents well-known notions and results,
some parts of the presentation are, at the best of our knowledge, original. In
particular, since we did not find in literature a rigorous enough treatment
of the proof-theoretic semantics of inference systems, we have developed it
autonomously, starting from a precise notion of tree and graph presented in
Section 3.1.1. There, we also prove Theorem 3.1, that allows us to give a new
proof of the equivalence between proof-theoretic and fixed point semantics in
the coinductive case (see Section 3.2.2).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we introduce the
notion of inference system, describing its syntax and semantics. The semantics
is provided in a proof-theoretic fashion, by means of proof trees, that are just
trees representing a proof for the validity of a judgement. To this aim we will
briefly discuss some concepts and results about trees and graphs. Section 3.2
describes a model-theoretic semantics of inference systems as fixed points
of a monotone function, on a particular complete lattice, induced by each
inference system. Exploiting this semantics we will also introduce induction
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and coinduction principles to reason about inference systems. Finally, we will
prove the equivalence between proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics.
In Section 3.3 we will discuss sufficient and necessary conditions on inference
systems that allows one to compute their semantics in an iterative way.
3.1 inference systems: syntax and semantics
Let us assume a universe U whose elements are called judgements, ranged over
by j.
Definition 3.1. An inference rule, or simply rule, is a pair
Pr
c
with Pr ⊆ U and
c ∈ U . A rule Pr
c
is an axiom if Pr = ∅.
An inference system I is a set of rules, that is, I ⊆ ℘(U )×U .
Let us show some examples to illustrate this concept. We denote by Z the set
of integers and by L the set of finite lists of integers, that can be constructed as
in the introduction: Λ is the empty list and every list has shape x1::. . .::xn::Λ
with x1, . . . , xn ∈ Z. We consider the definition of the predicate member(x, l),
mentioned in the introduction, that holds if the element x occurs in l. In this
case the universe can be the set {member(x, l) | x ∈ Z, l ∈ L}, so for instance
judgements like member(1, Λ), member(3, 1::3::Λ) or member(1, 1::3::2::Λ) are
in the universe.
Rules that define the predicate member(x, l) are necessarily infinitely many,
therefore it is not possible to write down all rules in an extensional way; we have
to represent them in some intensional way. To this aim it is a standard practice
to use meta-rules or rule schemes, that is, we show all possible shapes that a rule
can assume rather than all possible rules. So we need to use (meta-)variables
to range over base elements, in this case integers and finite lists of integers.
Therefore the definition of the predicate member(x, l) through an inference
system looks like the following:
member(x, x::l)
member(x, l)
member(x, y::l)
where x, y ∈ Z and l ∈ L. Actual rules can be obtained from these schemes by
instantiating variables with actual elements.
Another example, again mentioned in the introduction, is the predicate
allPos(l), that holds if all elements in l are strictly positive integers. The universe
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in this case can be {allPos(l) | l ∈ L} and the definition as inference system is
the following:
allPos(Λ)
allPos(l)
allPos(x::l)
x > 0
This example shows another important feature of meta-rules: side conditions.
Aside the second rule we have specified a condition (x > 0), called side condi-
tion, that x must satisfy. That is, side conditions restrict the set of values on
which variables range over, reducing the number of rules that can be obtained
as instances of a meta-rule. They are extremely useful in order to provide a finer
control on instances of rule schemes, and without them many definition are very
difficult to express as inference systems. For instance the definition of allPos(l)
without side conditions reported below requires an additional predicate pos(x),
that holds if x is positive.
pos(1)
pos(x)
pos(x + 1) allPos(Λ)
pos(x) allPos(l)
allPos(x::l)
However for this definition we need to change the universe in order to include
judgements of shape pos(x), hence the universe is {allPos(l) | l ∈ L} ∪ {pos(x) |
x ∈ Z}.
We report another example of a judgement regarding lists. We define the
judgement maxElem(l, x) that holds if x is the maximum element occurring in l.
Note that if l is not empty this element surely exists (every finite set of integers
has a maximum) and is unique, thus this judgement actually represents a (total)
function from L \ {Λ} to Z. The inference system is the following:
maxElem(x::Λ, x)
maxElem(l, y)
maxElem(x::l, z)
z = max{x, y}
Again the side condition is crucial to obtain a correct definition, but it can be
removed changing a bit the inference system.
Until now we have focused on the syntax of inference systems, explaining
how definitions given through them should be read. That is, we have relied on
reader’s intuition to convince her/him that a given inference system actually
defines an intended predicate or function. In order to formally prove the
correctness of such definitions we need to define in a rigorous way how an
inference system can be interpreted, that is, its semantics.
We first address this issue in a proof-theoretic setting, that allows us to define
a very intuitive semantics of inference systems. This semantics is based on the
notion of proof tree or derivation, hence to discuss it, we need to say something
about trees.
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3.1.1 A digression on graphs and trees
In this section we report some results about trees and graphs. Although such
results presented here are well-known, we have not found them presented in
this way. In (Ada´mek et al., 2015) some similar results can be found, that have
inspired this presentation, but with a substantial difference in some definitions,
for instance the definition of tree: they consider trees as special graphs and
do not consider labels. Furthermore, the conditions they impose on graphs in
order to be trees are very restrictive, hence many trees that for us are different
for them are the same. This restriction is due to the fact that the result they
aim to prove is stronger than our Theorem 3.1: they want trees to form a final
coalgebra for a suitable power-set functor.
Along this section we denote by A? the set of finite strings on the alphabet
A, which is an arbitrary set of symbols. We use Greek letters α, β, . . . to range
over strings and Roman letters a, b, . . . to range over symbols in A and we
implicitly identify strings of length one and symbols. Moreover we denote by
juxtaposition string concatenation, and by |α| the length of the string α. Finally
ε is the empty string. We also extend string concatenation to sets of strings,
denoting, for X, Y ⊆ A?, by XY the set {αβ ∈ A? | α ∈ X, β ∈ Y}; moreover if
either X or Y are singletons we will omit curly braces, namely αY = {α}Y.
On the set A? we can define the prefixing relation ≺ as follows: for any
α, β ∈ A?, α ≺ β if and only if there exists γ ∈ A? such that αγ = β. It can be
shown that ≺ is a partial order and thus, for any X ⊆ A?, the restriction of ≺
to X is well-defined and still a partial order. We say that a subset X ⊆ A? is
well-founded with respect to prefixing if any chain C ⊆ X is finite.
A non-empty subset L ⊆ A? is a tree language if it satisfies the prefix property,
that is, if αa ∈ L then α ∈ L. In particular ε ∈ L for any tree language L ⊆ A?.
Now we are able to define trees following (Courcelle, 1983).
Definition 3.2. Let A be an alphabet, L ⊆ A? a tree language and L a set. A
tree labelled in L is a function t : L→ L. The element t(ε) is called the root of t.
The notion of tree in Definition 3.2 is slightly different from that introduced
by Courcelle (1983). Indeed, there N is taken as fixed alphabet and, moreover,
a canonical choice is imposed on strings in a tree language, that is, if αn ∈ L
and m ≤ n, then αm ∈ L. Since, as we will see, the branching of the tree is
bounded by the cardinality of the alphabet, with this choice Courcelle (1983)
only considers trees with countable branching. Because we have to use trees in
the context of inference systems, this restrictions is too strong for us: it would
compel us to manage boring conditions on the cardinality of the universe U
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or of rule premises, hence we simply remove it. In this way, we also loose the
canonical choice, since the alphabet A may be not ordered, but this is not a real
issue.
If t : L→ L is a tree, then, for any α ∈ L, the subtree rooted at α is the function
tα : Lα → L, where Lα = {β ∈ A? | αβ ∈ L} and tα(β) = t(αβ). This notion is
well-defined since Lα is a tree language, hence tα is a tree. Note that t is itself a
subtree, rooted at ε. Subtrees rooted at α with |α| = 1 are called direct subtrees
of t. Finally a tree t is well-founded if dom(t) is well-founded with respect to ≺.
The notion of tree introduced in Definition 3.2 is mathematically precise, but
not very intuitive. A usual, and perhaps more intuitive, way to introduce trees
is as particular graphs. Intuitively, using a graph-like terminology, that we will
make precise below, we can see the elements in the tree language dom(t) as
nodes. Actually, thanks to the prefix property, a node α ∈ dom(t) represents
also all nodes (its prefixes) we have to traverse to reach α starting from the root
ε. For instance, if α = abc, we know that ε, a, ab, abc ∈ dom(t), hence they are
nodes of t and they form the path from the root to α. Therefore, requiring t to
be well-founded is equivalent to require that any sequence of prefixes is finite,
hence it is equivalent to require that all paths in t are finite.
To formally show that indeed trees can be seen as particular graphs, we start
by giving a definition of graph.
Definition 3.3. A graph is a pair (V, adj) where V is the set of nodes and
adj : V→ ℘(V) is the adjacency function.
A labelled graph, with labels in a set L, is a triple (V, adj, `), where (V, adj) is a
graph and ` : V→ L is the labelling function.
Taking a more abstract perspective a graph is a coalgebra for the power set
functor carried by the set of nodes and a labelled graph is a coalgebra for
the functor GL defined by V 7→ L × ℘(V), again carried by the set of nodes.
Therefore the notion of graph homomorphism is simply definable as coalgebra
homomorphism for these functors.
With this definition it is easy to assign a graph structure to a tree. Let
t : L→ L be a tree, we can represent it as a labelled graph with set of nodes L,
adjacency function chl(α) = {β ∈ L | β = αa} returning the children of a node α,
and labelling function given by t itself. Thanks to this graph structure we justify
terminology like node and adjacent for trees: a node is a string α ∈ dom(t) and
given a node α, the set of its adjacents is chl(α).
We now analyse the role of the alphabet A in the definition of tree (Defi-
nition 3.2). First note that its elements are essentially not relevant, because
the important thing are labels. What actually matters is the cardinality of
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A, that determines the maximum branching of the tree, that is, the maximum
number of children (hence subtrees) for each node α. In other words we have
|chl(α)| ≤ |A| for all α ∈ L. For instance, we can build essentially the same
trees if A is either {1, 2, 3} or {a, b, c}. However, the fact that they have both
cardinality 3 is relevant, since trees built on A have for each node at most 3
children. More precisely if |A| ≤ |B|, we know that there exists an injection
from A to B, hence we can identify elements of A with elements of B through
this injection. In this way, we can consider trees built on A as trees built on B,
and so, making implicit these identifications, we can always assume that all
trees are built on the same alphabet. For these reasons we will often abstract
away A and simply specify a cardinal number in order to make explicit the
branching of the tree.
It is convenient, especially to discuss proof trees, as we will do later, to
introduce a special choice for the alphabet A: we identify A with the set of
labels L. This choice is suitable for modelling proof trees, since they are labelled
on judgements, notably nodes are (labelled by) consequences of rules and their
children correspond to sets of premises. In this way, each node can be identified
by the path (string) of judgements/labels from the root to it. This choice can be
applied to all situations where children of each node have distinct labels, hence
it is a canonical choice in these cases, as formalized below.
We say that a tree t : L → L is children injective if for all α ∈ dom(t), the
restriction of t to the set chl(α) is injective; more explicitly, for all α ∈ dom(t),
if αa, αb ∈ dom(t) and t(αa) = t(αb), then a = b. In other words this means
that all children of any node must have different labels. Note that all subtrees
of a children injective tree are themselves children injective. Therefore, if
t : L → L is children injective, we can replace A with L, using the following
function
f : L→ L?
{
f (ε) = ε
f (αa) = f (α)t(αa)
Intuitively, the function f maps each node α ∈ L to the string of labels encoun-
tered in the path from the root to α. It is easy to see that f is injective and f (L)
is a tree language. Therefore we can define the tree t′ : f (L)→ L as follows{
t′(ε) = t(ε)
t′(αa) = a
and it is easy to check that for any α ∈ L, t′( f (α)) = t(α), hence they are
essentially the same tree.
We can simplify the representation even more: note that the definition of t′
depends only on its domain f (L) and on the choice for the root label, hence
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we can forget of functions and represent t as the pair (t(ε), f (L)). Essentially
a children injective tree is completely determined by the label of its root and
by the set of all paths (of labels) in it. Moreover the subtree rooted at α, tα, is
represented by (t(α), {β ∈ L? | αβ ∈ f (L)}).
We denote by Tλ(L) the set of all λ-branching trees labelled in L, that is, trees
built on an alphabet of cardinality λ, where λ is an arbitrary cardinal number.
We omit λ when it is not relevant. We denote by T ci(L) the set of children
injective trees labelled in L. If λ = |L| we have that T ci(L) ⊆ Tλ(L).
The main result of this section is Theorem 3.1. Before stating it we need
to briefly say something about paths on a (labelled) graph. Since paths are
independent from the labelling, we introduce them for graphs and everything
immediately extends to labelled graphs. Let G = (V, adj) be a graph, a path
in G is a non-empty string v0 · · · vn ∈ V? such that, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
vi+1 ∈ adj(vi), that is, for all pairs of subsequent nodes the latter is adjacent to
the former. We say that v0 · · · vn is a path from v0 to vn. Note that the string v0
of length 1 is also a path, from v0 to v0. We denote by path(G) the set of paths
in G.
Note that path(G) is closed under non-empty prefixes, that is, if αa is a path
and α is not empty, then α is a path too, and more generally if αβ ∈ path(G)
and α and β are not empty, then α, β ∈ path(G). Therefore we can easily
lift path(G) to a tree language, by adding to it the empty string. From these
observations immediately follows that, for each α ∈ path(G), the set {β ∈ V? |
αβ ∈ path(G)} ⊆ path(G) ∪ {ε} is a tree language.
Another important observation is that the sets Tλ(L) and T ci(L) both carry
a labelled graph structure with the following adjacency function:
dsub(t) = {tα | α ∈ dom(t), |α| = 1}
and labelling given by r(t) = t(ε).
Thanks to this observation, we can now prove the following theorem, that
will be essential to show the equivalence between proof-theoretic and fixed
point semantics of inference systems (see Section 3.2.2). Intuitively, this result
allows us to associate, with any node in a graph, in a canonical way, a tree
rooted in it, preserving the graph structure.
Theorem 3.1. The following facts hold.
1. Let G = (V, adj) be a graph, then there exists a graph homomorphism
P : V→ T ci(V) such the following diagram commutes:
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V T ci(V)
℘(V) ℘(T ci(V))
adj
P
dsub
℘(P)
2. Let G = (V, adj, `) be a labelled graph with labels in L, then there exists a
labelled graph homomorphism PL : V→ Tλ(L), with λ = |V|, such that
the following diagram commutes:
V Tλ(L)
L× ℘(V) L× ℘(Tλ(L))
(`, adj)
PL
(r, dsub)
GL(PL)
Proof. We will give a complete proof only for 1, for 2 we will only define the
function PL, then the proof is analogous.
1. The function P computes for each node the path expansion starting from
this node, that is, it maps each node v to the set of all paths starting with
v. More precisely the set of paths we compute for each node v is the
following :
Lv = {α ∈ V? | vα ∈ path(G)}
Hence, using the representation of children injective trees as pairs (r, L)
where r is a label and L is a tree language using labels as alphabet, we
have that
P(v) = (v, Lv)
Now we have to show that the diagram commutes, that is, for each node
v, ℘(P)(adj(v)) = dsub(P(v)). First note that each (u, L) ∈ dsub(P(v))
is such that L = {α ∈ V? | uα ∈ Lv}, in other words L = Lu; hence
(u, L) = P(u). Moreover, since uα ∈ Lv we have that vuα is a path in G,
and so u ∈ adj(v) and this shows the equality.
2. We only define the function PL. For each node v we have that PL(v) = t
where t is a tree defined as follows
t : Lv → L
{
t(ε) = `(v)
t(αu) = `(u)
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3.1.2 A proof-theoretic semantics
In this section we discuss a first way to define the semantics of an inference
system. We call it proof-theoretic since it is based on a notion of proof of the
validity of a judgement, that is, the construction of an object that witnesses that
a judgement is valid. These objects are named proof trees or derivations and are
defined below
Definition 3.4. Let I be an inference system, a proof tree (or derivation) in I
is a tree t : L → U , such that, for each node (labelled with) c having children
(labelled) in Pr, the rule
Pr
c
is in I .
More precisely, using the previously introduced notations, a proof tree t is
such that, for each node α ∈ L with t(α) = c, children of α are in bijection with a
set Pr ⊆ U such that Pr
c
∈ I . Therefore clearly a proof tree t : L→ U is children
injective, hence we can assume the canonical choice L ⊆ U ? and t(αj) = j for
each αj ∈ L. This allows us to rewrite the condition that a proof tree has to
satisfy as follows: for each α ∈ dom(t) with t(α) = c, there is a set Pr ⊆ U such
that chl(α) = αPr and
Pr
c
∈ I .
In the following we will often represent proof trees using stacks of rules, that
is, if
Pr
c
∈ I and T is a set of proof trees such that for all t ∈ T , t(ε) ∈ Pr and
vice versa, we denote by
T
c
the proof tree tc given by
dom(tc) = {ε} ∪
⋃
t∈T
t(ε)dom(t)
{
tc(ε) = c
tc(αj) = j
We say that a tree t is a proof tree for a judgement j ∈ U if it is a proof
tree rooted in j. With this terminology we can define two interpretations of an
inference system.
Definition 3.5. Let I be an inference system. Then:
• the inductive interpretation of I , denoted by Ind(I) is the set of judgements
having a well-founded proof tree
• the coinductive interpretation of I , denoted by CoInd(I) is the set of judge-
ments having an arbitrary (well-founded or not) proof tree
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Clearly by definition Ind(I) ⊆ CoInd(I) but the converse is not necessarily
true; indeed when the two interpretations are equal we are in a special case
with many pleasant properties.
Let us now discuss some examples on lists. Recall the definitions of predicates
member(x, l) and allPos(l)
member(x, x::l)
member(x, l)
member(x, y::l) allPos(Λ)
allPos(l)
allPos(x::l)
x > 0
where l ranges over finite lists and x, y on integers. We interpret these infer-
ence systems both inductively. The following are valid proof trees for some
judgements
member(1, 1::2::1::Λ)
member(1, 1::Λ)
member(1, 2::1::Λ)
member(1, 1::2::1::Λ)
allPos(Λ)
allPos(1::Λ)
allPos(2::1::Λ)
allPos(1::2::1::Λ)
Note that the same judgement can be proved with different proof trees, as for
member(1, 1::2::1::Λ). This is due to the nature of meta-rules that are in some
sense redundant: the second rule can be applied also in cases when the first
suffices. In order to remove this redundancy we can add a side condition to the
second rule, to make the two rule mutually exclusive: the needed side condition
is x 6= y. In this way the second tree shown above is not a proof tree since the
first step is not justified by any rule.
Writing down these trees it is clearer what we meant when we said that these
recursive definitions on lists “inspect” the list. Indeed at each step in the tree
we go deeper in the list looking at its tail. We can also see that for allPos(l) we
need to inspect the whole list to complete a proof, while for member(x, l) we
stop as soon as we find the first x in l.
We can also reason a little bit on what happens for judgements that should
not hold, like member(1, Λ) or allPos(−1::Λ). For the predicate member(x, l), if
x does not occur in l, a tentative proof will continue unfolding elements from
the list l until it reaches the empty list for which there is no applicable rule. For
allPos(l), if there is an x in l with x ≤ 0, a tentative proof will unfold elements
from l until it reaches x, and here it stops since there is no applicable rule.
Let us now assume that l ranges over both finite and infinite lists of integers.
We represent regular1 lists with syntactic equations as it is standard, so the list
1 That is, with a finite number of distinct sublists.
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L = 1::2::L is the infinite regular list in which 1 and 2 are repeated infinitely
many times.
Now, what happens if we interpret both inference systems coinductively? For
member(x, l) all valid judgements are still provable, since, as we said, it suffices
to inspect finitely many elements of the list to find x in l; however we have
some trouble with judgements that should not hold, for instance member(0, L)
can be proved as follows
...
member(0, L)
member(0, 2::L)
member(0, 1::2::L)
where the dots indicate that the proof continues indefinitely in the same way.
This proof is an infinite non-well-founded) proof tree since each step is correctly
justified by a rule, but it proves a judgement that should not hold. Therefore
we can conclude that even with infinite lists the correct interpretation for the
inference system defining member(x, l) is the inductive one.
For the predicate allPos(l) the situation is quite different, in some sense
symmetric, indeed for judgements that should not hold it is still true that we
reach in finitely many steps a non-positive element and so we do not have any
applicable rule. Moreover if l is infinite, since the predicate should check all
elements in the list, we cannot prove this judgement with a finite derivation, so
we need an infinite proof tree like the following
...
allPos(L)
allPos(2::L)
allPos(1::2::L)
Therefore we see that inductive and coinductive interpretations are both neces-
sary to define judgements in a proper way.
We now discuss a last example on lists that shows a very important situation.
Consider the following inference system
maxElem(x::Λ, x)
maxElem(l, y)
maxElem(x::l, z)
z = max{x, y}
defining a judgement that computes the maximum of a list if it exists, where
l ranges over finite and infinite lists. How we should interpret this inference
system? Clearly to compute a maximum we need to inspect the whole list, so
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we need possibly infinitely many steps, hence inductive interpretation seems to
be not enough. Then let us try with the coinductive interpretation, the following
are two valid derivations:
...
maxElem(L, 2)
maxElem(2::L, 2)
maxElem(1::2::L, 2)
...
maxElem(L, 3)
maxElem(2::L, 3)
maxElem(1::2::L, 3)
The first derivation proves a judgement that is expected to hold, while the
second proves an invalid judgement, since 3 does not belongs to the list L. So
also the coinductive interpretation is not suitable for this definition since it
considers too many judgements as valid. Our extension of inference systems,
presented in Chapter 4, is just designed to overcome this rigid dichotomy and
capture a broader range of definitions.
Let us conclude this section showing an example dealing with another im-
portant non-well-founded structure: graphs. This is another case in which
coinduction is needed in order to correctly define predicates and functions. We
represent a graph as a pair (V, adj) like in Definition 3.3 and we define the
judgement dist(v, u, δ) stating that the distance between node v and node u is δ,
with δ ∈N∪ {∞}. Here we mean as distance the minimum number of edges
we have to traverse to reach node u starting from v, infinite if we cannot reach u
from v. The definition is the following, where we assume that min∅ = ∞ and
n +∞ = ∞ for all n ∈N.
dist(v, v, 0)
dist(v1, u, δ1) . . . dist(vk, u, δk)
dist(v, u, 1+ δ)
v 6= u
adj(v) = {v1, . . . , vk}
δ = min{δ1, . . . , δk}
This definition should be interpreted coinductively, since the graph structure
is not well-founded, hence we have to deal with possibly infinite paths (e.g., a
finite path followed by a cycle) and the inductive interpretation is not able to
deal with such situations. Consider for instance the following graph
e b
d a c
We need infinite proofs in order to derive, for instance, judgements like
dist(c, e, 2) or dist(b, e, 2), since in both cases, to reach e, we need to pass
3.2 fixed point semantics 35
Figure 1: Proof trees for dist(c, e, 2) and dist(c, e, 2)
dist(e, e, 0)
...
dist(a, e, 1)
dist(b, e, 2)
dist(a, e, 1)
dist(c, e, 2)
dist(e, e, 0)
...
dist(b, e, 2)
dist(a, e, 1)
dist(b, e, 2)
through a that is part of a cycle, as shown in Figure 1. Note that dist(e, v, ∞) is
the only valid judgement for all v ∈ {a, b, c, d}, since there are no outgoing edges
from e, hence we can only instantiate the second rule with {δ1, . . . , δk} = ∅ (no
premises) and so δ = ∞. Finally let us consider judgements of shape dist(d, c, δ).
A derivation schema is shown in Figure 2. Now, which value of δ makes the
Figure 2: Proof tree for dist(d, c, δ)
dist(e, c, ∞)
...
dist(a, e, δ− 3)
dist(b, c, δ− 2)
dist(a, c, δ− 1)
dist(d, c, δ)
proof correct? Surely for δ = ∞ the proof is valid, because it becomes cyclic.
Actually there is no other possible value, because going up in the proof tree, δ
should indefinitely decrease, and this is not possible since δ is a natural number
and so it cannot go below zero. Therefore as expected dist(d, c, ∞) is the only
derivable judgement, meaning that we cannot reach c starting from d.
3.2 fixed point semantics
In this section we will introduce another way to assign a semantics to an
inference system, relying on order-theoretic notions discussed in Chapter 2. In
particular we will characterize inductive and coinductive interpretations as fixed
points of a monotone function on the power set complete lattice (℘(U ), ⊆), we
will derive from this characterization proof principles to reason about these
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semantics and finally we will prove the equivalence with the proof-theoretic
semantics.
The starting point is the observation that an inference system I induces a
function on ℘(U ) defined as follows:
FI(S) = {c ∈ U | Pr ⊆ S, Prc ∈ I}
This function is called (one step) inference operator, since intuitively FI(S) contains
all judgements that can be derived from those in S using a single rule.
For instance, considering the inference systems on finite lists of integers from
the previous section we get the following inference operators:
Fmember(S) ={member(x, x::l) | x ∈ Z, l ∈ L}∪
{member(x, y::l) | member(x, l) ∈ S}
FallPos(S) ={allPos(Λ)} ∪ {allPos(x::l) | x > 0, allPos(l) ∈ S}
FmaxElem(S) ={maxElem(x::Λ, x) | x ∈ Z}∪
{maxElem(x::l, z) | maxElem(l, y) ∈ S, z = max{x, y}}
The inference operator of an inference system has the following key property.
Proposition 3.1. Let I be an inference system, then FI is monotone.
Proof. Let X ⊆ Y ⊆ U , we have to show that FI(X) ⊆ FI(Y). Consider a
judgement c ∈ FI(X), by definition of FI there exists Pr ⊆ X ⊆ Y with Prc ∈ I .
By transitivity we get Pr ⊆ Y and again by definition of FI we get c ∈ FI(Y) as
needed.
Now since ℘(U ) carries a complete lattice structure and FI is monotone,
we can apply the Knaster-Tarski theorem (Theorem 2.4), that ensures us the
existence of the least and the greatest fixed points, µFI and νFI .
In the rest of this section we will justify the two following sentences
• µFI is the inductive interpretation of I
• νFI is the coinductive interpretation of I
3.2 fixed point semantics 37
3.2.1 Induction and coinduction principles
An important feature of the fixed point semantics is that it provides immediately
two powerful proof principles as described in Section 2.3. These principles
are induction and coinduction, that can be used to show how the least and
the greatest fixed point, respectively, are related to a set representing a given
specification. Let us reformulate them in the context of inference systems.
Assume that D ⊆ U is a set (inductively or coinductively) defined by an
inference system I . Typically we have an expected semantics described as a set
S (for specification) and we would like to prove that D and S agree with each
other in some way. More precisely we are often interested to prove S ⊆ D,
i.e., the completeness of the definition, and/or D ⊆ S , i.e., the soundness of the
definition.
We say that a set S ⊆ U is closed if FI(S) ⊆ S , and we say that S is consistent
if S ⊆ FI(S). Then we can reformulate induction and coinduction principles as
follows:
induction if S is closed, then µFI ⊆ S
coinduction if S is consistent, then S ⊆ νFI
In other words, the induction principle allows us to prove soundness of an
inductive definition, while the coinduction principle allows us to prove com-
pleteness of a coinductive definition. Note that if S is both closed and consistent,
that is, it is a fixed point of FI , then we have µFI ⊆ S ⊆ νFI , as expected.
For a set S ⊆ U , being closed or consistent can be easily expressed in terms
of the rules in the inference system.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a subset S ⊆ U , then
1. S is closed iff for each rule Pr
c
∈ I , Pr ⊆ S implies c ∈ S
2. S is consistent iff for all c ∈ S there exists a rule Pr
c
∈ I such that Pr ⊆ S
Proof.
1. We prove the two implications.
(⇒). Consider a rule Pr
c
∈ I such that Pr ⊆ S . Then c ∈ FI(S) ⊆ S , so
c ∈ S .
(⇐). Consider c ∈ FI(S). By definition of the inference operator we know
that there is a rule
Pr
c
∈ I such that Pr ⊆ S , hence by hypothesis c ∈ S .
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2. We show the two implications.
(⇒). Consider c ∈ S , hence c ∈ FI by hypothesis. By definition of the
inference operator we know that there is a rule
Pr
c
∈ I such that Pr ⊆ S .
(⇐). Consider c ∈ S . By hypothesis there is a rule Pr
c
∈ I such that
Pr ⊆ S , so c ∈ FI(S).
Note that these characterizations are expressed in terms of rules, however
if the inference system is defined using meta-rules, we can reason on them
rather than on plain rules, opportunely quantifying on variables occurring in
meta-rules.
We now show two examples of application of the induction and coinduction
principles. In particular we will show that the definition of member(x, l) is
sound with respect to the expected semantics and that the definition of allPos(l)
is complete with respect to the expected semantics.
soundness of member(x, l). The expected semantics is given by the
following set, where write x ∈ l to mean that x occurs at least once in l.
S = {member(x, l) | x ∈ l}
Set D = µFmember, so we have to show that D ⊆ S . We prove this by induction,
hence we have only to prove that S is closed.
• Consider the axiom
member(x, x::l)
. Since there are no premises we have
only to show that member(x, x::l) ∈ S , that is obviously true.
• Consider the rule member(x, l)
member(x, y::l)
and assume that member(x, l) ∈ S , that
is, x ∈ l. Hence surely x ∈ y::l since all elements in l occur also in y::l.
completeness of allPos(l). The expected semantics is given by the
following set, where write x ∈ l to mean that x occurs at least once in l.
S = {allPos(l) | ∀x ∈ l. x > 0}
Set D = νFallPos, so we have to show that S ⊆ D. We prove this by coinduction,
hence we have only to prove that S is consistent. The proof is very easy.
Consider l such that allPos(l) ∈ S . If l is empty, then allPos(l) is the consequence
of the axiom. Otherwise, if l = x::l′, we have that x > 0, and ∀y ∈ l′.y > 0,
hence allPos(l′) ∈ S . Therefore the needed rule is allPos(l
′)
allPos(x::l′)
.
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3.2.2 Equivalence with the proof-theoretic semantics
In this section we will come up with two results stating that proof-theoretic and
fixed point semantics agree with each other. These results are of paramount
importance since they allow us to equivalently use one of the two characteriza-
tions depending on which is more suitable in each situation. A sketch of the
same proofs can be found in (Leroy and Grall, 2009), even if our proof for the
equivalence in the coinductive case is quite different.
Proofs for the inductive and the coinductive case are different, but share a
common underlying scheme: one inclusion is proved using induction and coin-
duction principles, respectively, the other one showing, using properties of trees,
that Ind(I) and CoInd(I), respectively, enjoy the induction and coinduction
principles. In particular for the inductive case we rely on the well-foundedness
of trees to build an inductive reasoning, while for the coinductive one we will
use the property of trees described in point 1 of Theorem 3.1.
Let us start with the inductive case. The following lemma states that the
inductive interpretation of an inference system I in terms of proof trees, that is,
Ind(I), enjoys the induction principle.
Lemma 3.1. Let I be an inference system and S a closed subset of U , then
Ind(I) ⊆ S .
Proof. Consider a judgement c ∈ Ind(I), so it has a well-founded proof tree t.
Rephrasing the statement we have to show that the root of t belongs to S for
any well-founded proof tree t. Since t is a well-founded tree we can reason by
well-founded induction on it, namely, to prove the thesis, we assume it for all
subtrees of t and prove it for t.
By definition of proof tree we that there is a rule
Pr
c
∈ I such that judgements
in Pr are the children of c in t. In other words each j ∈ Pr is the root of a
subtree of t. Therefore by inductive hypothesis j ∈ S , hence Pr ⊆ S . Now, by
hypothesis S is closed and this implies that c ∈ S as needed.
We can now state and prove the equivalence for the inductive case.
Theorem 3.2. Let I be an inference system, then Ind(I) = µFI .
Proof. First note that, since µFI is a fixed point of FI , it is in particular a
pre-fixed point, namely, it is closed. Therefore by Lemma 3.1 we get the first
inclusion Ind(I) ⊆ µFI .
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We show the other one by induction, hence we have to show that Ind(I)
is closed with respect to FI . To this aim consider a rule
Pr
c
∈ I such that
Pr ⊆ Ind(I). By definition of Ind(I), for each judgement j ∈ Pr there is a
well-founded proof tree tj : Lj → U rooted in j. Therefore we can define a
well-founded tree t with dom(t) = {ε} ∪⋃j∈Pr jLj as follows:{
t(ε) = c
t(jα) = tj(α)
As a consequence we get that c ∈ Ind(I), hence Ind(I) is closed and this implies
by induction that µFI ⊆ Ind(I).
We now address the coinductive case. As mentioned above the proof scheme
is very similar, so let us start with a lemma stating that CoInd(I) enjoys the
coinduction principle.
Lemma 3.2. Let I be an inference system and S a consistent subset of U , then
S ⊆ CoInd(I).
Proof. By hypothesis S is consistent, so for each judgement j ∈ S we can
choose a rule
Prj
j
∈ I such that Prj ⊆ S . In other words we can define the
map adj : S → ℘(S) given by adj(j) = Prj, that turns S into a graph as in
Definition 3.3.
By Theorem 3.1 there exists a map P : S → T ci(S) making the following
diagram commute.
S T ci(S)
℘(S) ℘(T ci(S))
adj
P
dsub
℘(P)
Therefore, for each j ∈ S , P(j) is a tree rooted in j and labelled in S , hence
in U . Moreover P(j) is a proof tree, since the commutativity of the diagram
ensures that children of a node labelled with j′ in P(j) are exactly labelled with
judgements in adj(j′), namely, in Prj′ . Therefore j ∈ CoInd(I) as needed.
In the end we conclude the section stating and proving the equivalence for
the coinductive case, that is proved using the coinduction principle, again in
analogy with the inductive case.
Theorem 3.3. Let I be an inference system, then CoInd(I) = νFI .
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Proof. First note that, since νFI is a fixed point of FI , it is in particular a post-
fixed point, namely, it is consistent. Therefore by Lemma 3.2 we get the first
inclusion νFI ⊆ CoInd(I).
We show the other one by coinduction, hence we have to show that CoInd(I)
is consistent with respect to FI . To this aim consider a judgement c ∈ CoInd(I).
By definition of coinductive interpretation there exists a proof tree t rooted in c.
All directed subtrees of t, that is, all tj ∈ dsub(t), are themselves proof trees for
their roots, namely, tj is a proof tree for j, hence j ∈ CoInd(I). Moreover, since
t is a proof tree, the set Pr = {j ∈ U | tj ∈ dsub(t)} is such that Prc ∈ I and
Pr ⊆ CoInd(I). Therefore CoInd(I) is consistent and this implies by coinduction
that CoInd(I) ⊆ νFI .
3.3 continuity and iteration
In Section 2.4 we have introduced an iterative characterization of the least
and the greatest fixed point, provided that the function is either upward or
downward continuous. In this section we give some sufficient and necessary
conditions condition on inference systems to ensure that the induced infer-
ence operator is continuous. This is particularly relevant because the iterative
characterization gives us other proof principles in addition to induction and
coinduction, and provides a way to compute these fixed points just iterating
the inference operator.
We start with the inductive case.
Definition 3.6. An inference system I is finitary if for every rule Pr
c
∈ I , Pr is
a finite set.
All the examples we have provided so far are finitary inference systems,
but in general it is not guaranteed that every rule has a finite set of premises.
Finitary inference systems have a particularly pleasant property: they induce
an upward continuous inference operator.
Theorem 3.4. Let I be a finitary inference system, then FI is upward continu-
ous.
Proof. Let C ⊆ ℘(U ) be a chain. We have to show that FI(⋃C) = ⋃ FI(C). By
Proposition 2.3 we know that
⋃
FI(C) ⊆ FI(⋃C), thus we have to prove only
the other inclusion.
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Consider a judgement c ∈ FI(⋃C), by definition of FI there is a rule Prc ∈ I
such that Pr ⊆ ⋃C. Since Pr is finite by hypothesis, there exists a finite subset
X ⊆ C such that Pr ⊆ ⋃X.
Note that X is itself a chain, because it is a subset of a chain, and being finite
there exists the top element of X, that is, an element M ∈ X such that, for each
S ∈ X, S ⊆ M. This implies that ⋃X = M and so Pr ⊆ M.
Therefore c ∈ FI(M) and, since FI(M) ∈ FI(C), we get that c ∈ ⋃ FI(C), from
which follows FI(
⋃
C) ⊆ ⋃ FI(C).
Actually the above proof shows that the finitariness condition implies that
the inference operator is continuous, but in a stronger way with respect to the
notion of continuity introduced in Definition 2.9. Indeed, the inference operator
induced by a finitary inference system preserves the least upper bound of any
chain, rather than only of countable ones.
Note that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition. Indeed there are non-
finitary inference systems that induce upward continuous inference operator,
for instance the following one.
0
n
n + 1
N
0
with universe U = Z. The operator is continuous since the non-finitary rule,
that might break continuity, is redundant, in the sense that if it is removed the
inductive interpretation remains the same. Actually this is a particular instance
of a more general fact. We say that an inference system I is countable if all rules
have countable premises.
Theorem 3.5. Let I be a countable inference system such that FI is upward
continuous, then there exists a finitary inference system I ′ ⊆ I such that
FI ′ = FI .
Proof. Set I ′ = {Pr
c
∈ I | Pr is finite} ⊆ I . Surely for all S ⊆ U , FI ′(X) ⊆
FI(X), by construction. To prove the other inclusion it is enough to show that
for each rule
Pr
c
∈ I with Pr an infinite and countable set, there exists a rule
Pr′
c
∈ I with Pr′ ⊆ Pr a finite set.
Consider a rule
Pr
c
∈ I with Pr an infinite and countable set. Hence, there
exists a bijection between N and Pr. Let (xi)i∈N be the enumeration of all
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elements in Pr, induced by such bijection. We construct a chain C = (Xi)i∈N
as follows:
X0 = ∅ Xn+1 = Xn ∪ {xn}
It is easy to check that Xn is a finite set for each n ∈N (|Xn| = n) and ⋃C =
Pr. By the continuity of FI we know that
⋃
FI(C) = FI(
⋃
C) = FI(Pr), hence
c ∈ ⋃ FI(C), and this implies that there exist n ∈N such that c ∈ FI(Xn). From
the definition of FI it follows that there is a rule
Pr′
c
∈ I with Pr′ ⊆ Xn ⊆ Pr,
and, since Xn is finite, also Pr′ is finite as needed.
It is immediate that if U is a countable set, then every inference system on U
is countable; hence, in this case, we can say that for all inference systems I , FI is
upward continuous if and only if there exists a finitary inference system I ′ ⊆ I
such that FI = FI ′ . Actually, the same result can be proved also without the
countability hypothesis, however this requires a stronger notion of continuity
and transfinite induction.
With Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 we have provided an almost complete
characterization of inference systems that induce an upward continuous infer-
ence operator, at least in the case of a countable universe.
This characterization gives us a way to establish if we can compute the
least fixed point by iterative application of the inference operator to the empty
set. This iterative computation corresponds to the intuitive idea that we start
assuming that every judgement is not valid, then, applying once the inference
operator, we get what is surely valid (the consequences of axioms), then we
compute what we can derive from axioms and so on. In other words in FnI(∅)
there are the judgements that we can prove in n steps.
Another observation we can do under this additional hypothesis is that, since
Ind(I) = ⋃ IFI ,∅, each judgement j ∈ Ind(I) belongs to some FnI(∅), that is,
it must be provable in a finite number of steps. This implies, from the proof-
theoretic perspective, that all judgements are derivable by a well-founded proof
tree with finite depth.
Let us consider the case of downward continuity. This is much more com-
plicated, indeed we will not give a characterization for inference systems that
induce a downward continuous inference operator, but we will characterize a
more restrictive class of them.
Definition 3.7. An inference system I is deterministic if for any two rules
Pr
c
,
Pr′
c′
∈ I if c = c′ then Pr = Pr′.
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We will show that deterministic inference systems induce an inference opera-
tor that preserves the meet of any set, that is, for X ⊆ ℘(U ), FI(⋂X) = ⋂ FI(X).
Clearly, since chains are particular subsets of ℘(U ), this condition implies down-
ward continuity.
Theorem 3.6. Let I be a deterministic inference system, then, for each X ⊆
℘(U ), FI(⋂X) = ⋂ FI(X).
Proof. From Proposition 2.3 we know that FI(
⋂
X) ⊆ ⋂ FI(X), for X ⊆ ℘(U ),
so we have to prove only the other inclusion.
Consider a judgement c ∈ ⋂ FI(X), hence for all A ∈ X there is a rule
PrA
c
∈ I such that PrA ⊆ A. Since the inference system is deterministic, for all
A, B ∈ X, PrA = PrB = Pr, and so Pr ⊆ ⋂X. This implies that c ∈ FI(⋂X) as
needed.
Examples of deterministic inference systems are those for allPos(l) and
member(x, l) using the side condition x 6= y (see Section 3.1).
Also in this case we can prove a sort of necessary condition.
Theorem 3.7. Let I be an inference system such that FI preserves the greatest
lower bound, then there exists a deterministic inference system I ′ ⊆ I such
that FI ′ = FI .
Proof. For all c ∈ U , set Pc = {Pr ∈ ℘(U ) | Prc ∈ I} and Prc =
⋂
Pc. We first
show that there is a set Pr′c ⊆ Prc such that
Pr′c
c
∈ I . Indeed, by hypothesis we
get that FI(Prc) = FI(
⋂
Pc) =
⋂
FI(Pc). Since by construction c ∈ ⋂ FI(Pc) we
get that c ∈ FI(Prc), and so there is a rule Pr
′
c
c
∈ I such that Pr′c ⊆ Prc.
Set I ′ the set of all rules Pr
′
c
c
in I for every consequence c of a rule in I ,
clearly I ′ ⊆ I . Now for every X ⊆ U we trivially have that FI ′(X) ⊆ FI(X),
hence we have only to prove the other inclusion. If c ∈ FI(X), there is a rule
Pr
c
∈ I such that Pr ⊆ X. But this implies that Pr′c ⊆ Pr ⊆ X and so c ∈ FI ′(X)
as needed.
These characterizations provide us with a sufficient condition to establish
when an inference system induces a downward continuous inference oper-
ator, hence if we can compute the greatest fixed point, i.e., the coinductive
interpretation, iteratively applying this operator.
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This description of the greatest fixed point, CoInd(I) = ⋂ IFI ,U , can be intu-
itively explained as follows: we start assuming that every judgement is valid,
then, applying the inference operator, we loose all judgements that cannot be
proved even assuming that everything is valid, ad so on. Hence in FnI we find
all judgements that we have not been lost in n steps.
We conclude the section noting that continuity is a quite strong condition on
the function. Indeed there are cases in which we can compute iteratively the
least or the greatest fixed point even if the function is not continuous. Consider
for instance the following inference system
n
n > 0
{n ∈N | n > 0}
0
The induced inference operator is not continuous since it does not preserves
the least upper bound of the chain C = (In)n∈N where In is defined by I0 = ∅
and In+1 = In ∪ {n}. However we have that
F0I(∅) = ∅
F1I(∅) = {n ∈N | n > 0}
F2I(∅) =N
F3I(∅) =N
hence in three steps we reach the least fixed point even if FI is not continuous.

4
I N F E R E N C E S Y S T E M S W I T H C O A X I O M S
When we deal with structured data types a typical issue is defining predicates
and/or functions on them, and, since these types have a structure, we would
like to exploit it in the definition. This definition technique is called structural
recursion and essentially provides a recursive definition of a predicate or of a
function that mirrors the structure of a data type. This recursive definition then
has to be interpreted and, as we have seen, this can be typically done either
inductively or coinductively.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, we can say there are two main
classes of structured data types: inductive (well-founded) data types and
coinductive (non-well-founded) data types. In order to deal with inductive
data types, the inductive interpretation of structurally recursive definitions
is enough, thanks to the well-foundedness of the data type: we can reach a
base case in finitely many steps. For coinductive data types things are more
complicated: depending on what we are defining, we will need either the
inductive or coinductive interpretation, and there are also cases where neither
is suitable.
Recently several approaches have been proposed to provide a semantics to
structurally recursive definitions on coinductive data types. In an operational
style we can find proposals in all most popular paradigms: logic (Simon et al.,
2006, 2007), object-oriented (Ancona and Zucca, 2012, 2013), functional (Jeannin
et al., 2013, 2017) and type theory (Abel and Pientka, 2013; Abel et al., 2013;
Coquand, 1993; Møgelberg, 2014). But there are also more abstract approaches,
such as (Ada´mek et al., 2006a; Capretta et al., 2006, 2009). The majority of
these proposals is characterized by a strong dichotomy between induction and
coinduction, that in some cases makes semantics too rigid.
As shown in Chapter 3 also inference systems suffer from this dichotomy,
that makes impossible to assign a precise semantics to definitions that look
very natural. Hence the need emerges for a more flexible interpretation, that
overcomes this dichotomy.
In this chapter we will propose an extension to inference systems, both in
syntax and semantics, that will allow more flexible interpretations of them.
This extension is inspired by some of the operational models mentioned above
(Ancona, 2013; Ancona and Zucca, 2012, 2013) and, in our intention, will serve
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as an abstract framework for a better understanding of these operational models,
allowing formal reasoning on them.
The key concept of this extension are coaxioms, that are special rules that
need to be specified together with the usual definition in order to control its
semantics. In other words, coaxioms allow one to choose as interpretation a
fixed point that is not necessarily either the least or the greatest one. In this way
we can assign a more natural semantics to definitions that otherwise would
have a very strange meaning. In addition we will also show that inductive and
coinductive interpretations are particular cases of our extension, proving that it
is actually an extension. Another important feature is that in this framework we
can interpret also inference systems where judgements that should be defined
inductively and coinductively are mixed together in the same definition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we will introduce
inference systems with coaxioms, informally explaining their semantics with a
bunch of examples. The fixed point semantics for inference systems with
coaxioms is formally defined in Section 4.2. Here we present closure and kernel
systems, which are well-know notions on the power-set, in the more general
setting of complete lattices, getting the definition of the bounded fixed point, that
represents the semantics induced by coaxioms. In Section 4.3 we introduce
several equivalent proof-theoretic semantics based on the notion of proof tree.
Particularly interesting are the two characterizations exploiting the new concept
of approximated proof tree, that will allow us to provide the semantics in terms
of sequences of well-founded trees, without considering non-well-founded
derivations. Proof techniques for coaxioms to prove both completeness and
soundness of definitions are discussed in Section 4.4. In particular we will
introduce the bounded coinduction principle that is a generalization of the standard
coinduction principle, aimed to show the completeness of a definition expressed
in terms of an inference system with coaxioms. Finally, in Section 4.5, we try
to illustrate weaknesses and strengths of our framework, using various, more
involved, examples.
This chapter presents in more detail the work we have done in (Ancona et al.,
2017b). Notably, here we discuss closures and kernels from a more general
point of view (see Section 4.2.1), in order to better frame the bounded fixed
point in lattice theory. Furthermore, thanks to a more formal treatment of
proof trees, we introduce an additional proof-theoretic characterization, using
approximated proof trees (see Theorem 4.8). We also present another example
of application of coaxioms to graphs (see Section 4.5.3).
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4.1 introduction to coaxioms
In this section we will introduce coaxioms and try to illustrate their behaviour
be means of a bunch of examples. Recall from Section 3.1 that U is a universe
of judgements.
Definition 4.1. An inference system with coaxioms is a pair (I , γ) where I is an
inference system and γ ⊆ U is a set of coaxioms.
A coaxiom c ∈ γ will be written as •
c
, very much like an axiom, and,
analogously to an axiom, it can be used as initial assumption to derive other
judgements. However, coaxioms will be used in a special way, that is, intuitively
they can be used only “at infinite depth” in a derivation. This will allow us to
impose an initial assumption also to infinite proof trees, that otherwise are not
required to have such starting point. We will make precise this notion in next
sections, now we will show some examples to illustrate how to use coaxioms to
govern the semantics of an inference system.
Analogously to sets of rules, sets of coaxioms can be expressed by a meta-
coaxiom with side conditions.
Let us start with an introductory example concerning graphs, that are a
widely used non-well-founded data type. Consider a graph (V, adj) where V
is the set of nodes and adj : V → ℘(V) is the adjacency function. We want to
define the judgement v ?→N stating that nodes in the set N are those reachable
from v.
We define this judgement with the following (meta-)rule and (meta-)coaxiom:
v1
?→N1 . . . vk ?→Nk
v ?→{v} ∪N1 ∪ . . . ∪Nk
adj(v) = {v1, . . . , vk} •
v ?→∅
v ∈ V
For instance, in the case of a graph with nodes a, b, c, with an arc from a into
b and conversely, and c isolated, we would get the following (meta-)rules and
coaxioms:
b ?→N
a ?→{a} ∪N
a ?→N
b ?→{b} ∪N c ?→{c}
•
a ?→∅
•
b ?→∅
•
c ?→∅
Let us ignore for a moment coaxioms and reason about the standard inter-
pretations. It is clear that, if we interpret the system inductively, we will only
prove the judgement c ?→{c}, because it is the only axiom and other rules do not
depend on it. In other words, the judgement v ?→N , like other judgements on
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graphs, cannot be defined inductively by structural recursion, since the struc-
ture is not well-founded. In particular the problem are cycles, where the proof
may be trapped, continuously unfolding the structure of the graph without
ever reaching a base case. Usual implementations of visits on graphs rely on
imperative features and correct this issue by marking already visited nodes. In
this way, they avoid visiting twice the same node, actually breaking cycles.
On the other hand, if we interpret the meta-rules coinductively (excluding
again the coaxioms), then we get the correct judgements a ?→{a, b} and b ?→{a, b},
but we also get the wrong judgements a ?→{a, b, c} and b ?→{a, b, c}, as shown
by the following derivations
...
a ?→{a, b}
b ?→{a, b}
a ?→{a, b}
...
b ?→{a, b}
a ?→{a, b}
b ?→{a, b}
...
a ?→{a, b, c}
b ?→{a, b, c}
a ?→{a, b, c}
...
b ?→{a, b, c}
a ?→{a, b, c}
b ?→{a, b, c}
We define a different interpretation, called interpretation generated by coaxioms
and denoted Gen(I ,γ), which takes into account coaxioms in the following
way.
1. First, we take the smallest closed superset of the set of coaxioms. In
other words, we consider the inference system Iunionsqγ obtained enriching
I by judgements in γ considered as axioms, and we take its inductive
interpretation Ind(Iunionsqγ).
2. Then, we take the largest consistent subset of Ind(Iunionsqγ). In other words,
we take the coinductive interpretation of the inference system obtained
from I by keeping only rules with consequence in Ind(Iunionsqγ), that is, we
define
Gen(I ,γ) = CoInd(IuInd(Iunionsqγ))
where IuS, with I inference system and S ⊆ U , denotes the inference system
obtained from I by keeping only rules with consequence in S.
In the example, since the power-set is finite, every monotone function is
continuous, hence we can compute fixed points iteratively. Therefore, in the
first phase, we obtain the following judgements (each line corresponds to an
iteration of the inference operator):
a ?→∅, b ?→∅, c ?→∅, c ?→{c}
a ?→∅, b ?→∅, c ?→∅, c ?→{c}, a ?→{a}, b ?→{b}
a ?→∅, b ?→∅, c ?→∅, c ?→{c}, a ?→{a}, b ?→{b}, a ?→{a, b}, b ?→{a, b}
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The last set is closed, hence it is Ind(Iunionsqγ).
In the second phase, each iteration of the inference operator removes judge-
ments which cannot be inferred from the previous step, that is, we get:
c ?→{c}, a ?→{a}, b ?→{b}, a ?→{a, b}, b ?→{a, b}
c ?→{c}, a ?→{a, b}, b ?→{a, b}
This last set is consistent, hence it is Gen(I ,γ), and it is indeed the expected
result.
In terms of proof trees, judgements in Gen(I ,γ) are those which have an
arbitrary (well-founded or not) proof tree t in the inference system I , whose
nodes all have a well-founded proof tree in Iunionsqγ. Note that for nodes in t which
are roots of a well-founded subtree this always holds (a well-founded proof tree
in I is a well-founded proof tree in Iunionsqγ as well), hence the condition is only
significant for nodes which are roots of an infinite path in the proof tree.
For instance, in the example, the judgement a ?→{a, b} has an infinite proof
tree in I where each node has a finite proof tree in Iunionsqγ, as shown below.
...
a ?→{a, b}
b ?→{a, b}
a ?→{a, b}
a ?→∅
b ?→{b}
a ?→{a, b}
b ?→∅
a ?→{a}
b ?→{a, b}
Moreover, there is another important property which will be proved in
Section 4.3: if a judgement belongs to Gen(I ,γ), then, for all n ≥ 0, it has a
well-founded proof tree in the inference system Iunionsqγ where coaxioms can only
be used at depth greater than n.
For instance, in the example, it is easy to see that, for any n, we can obtain a
finite proof tree for the judgement a ?→{a, b} in Iunionsqγ where coaxioms are used at
depth greater than n, as shown below.
a ?→∅
b ?→{b}
a ?→{a, b}
b ?→∅
a ?→{a}
b ?→{a, b}
a ?→{a, b}
a ?→∅
b ?→{b}
a ?→{a, b}
b ?→{a, b}
a ?→{a, b}
. . .
This last property motivates the name “coaxioms”. Indeed, dually to axioms,
which can be used in the proof tree at every depth, including 0, coaxioms can
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only be used “at an infinite depth” in the proof tree. Therefore, coaxioms filter
out undesired infinite proof trees; in other words, they bound from above the
greatest fixed point corresponding to the semantics of the generalized inference
system.
As a second example, we consider the definition of the first sets in a grammar.
Let us represent a context-free grammar by its set of terminals T, its set of
non-terminals N, and all the productions A ::= β1 | . . . | βn with left-hand side
A, for each non-terminal A. Recall that, for each α ∈ (T ∪ N)+, we can define
the set first(α) = {σ | σ ∈ T, α→?σβ}. Informally, first(α) is the set of the initial
terminal symbols of the strings which can be derived from a string α in 0 or
more steps.
We defines the judgement first(α,F ) by the following inference system with
coaxioms, where F ⊆ T.
first(σα, {σ})σ ∈ T
first(A,F )
first(Aα,F )
A ∈ N
A 6→?e
first(A,F ) first(α,F ′)
first(Aα,F ∪F ′)
A ∈ N
A→?e
first(e,∅)
first(β1,F1) . . . first(βn,Fn)
first(A,F1 ∪ . . . ∪ Fn) A ::= β1 | . . . | βn
•
first(A,∅)
A ∈ N
The rules of the inference system correspond to the natural recursive defini-
tion of first. Note, in particular, that in a string of shape Aα, if the non-terminal
A is nullable, that is, we can derive from it the empty string, then the first set for
Aα should also include the first set for α.
As in the previous example on graphs, the problem with this recursive
definition is that, since the non-terminals in a grammar can mutually refer to
each other, the function defined by the inductive interpretation can be undefined,
since it may never reach a base case. That is, a naive top-down implementation
might not terminate. For this reason, first sets are typically computed by an
imperative bottom-up algorithm, or the top-down implementation is corrected
by marking already encountered non-terminals, analogously to what is done for
visiting graphs. Again as in the previous example, the coinductive interpretation
may fail to be a function, whereas, with the coaxioms, we get the expected
result.
Let us now consider some examples of judgements concerning lists. We
consider arbitrary (finite or infinite) lists of integers and denote by L∞ the set
of such lists. We first consider the judgement maxElem(l, x), with l ∈ L∞ and
x ∈ Z, stating that x is the maximum element that occurs in l. This judgement
has a natural definition by structural recursion we have discussed in Section 3.1
where we have shown that neither inductive nor coinductive interpretations are
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able to capture the expected semantics. Therefore in the following definition
we have added coaxioms to the inference system from Section 3.1 in order to
restrict the coinductive interpretation.
maxElem(x::Λ, x)
maxElem(l, y)
maxElem(x::l, z)
z = max{x, y} •
maxElem(x::l, x)
Recall that the problem with the coinductive interpretation is that it accepts all
judgements maxElem(l, x) where x is an upper bound of l, even if it does not
occur in l. The coaxiom, thanks to the way it is used, imposes that maxElem(l, x)
may hold only if x appears somewhere in the list, hence undesired proofs are
filtered out.
A similar example is given by the judgement elems(l, xs) where l ∈ L∞ and
xs ⊆ Z, stating that xs is the carrier of the list l, that is, the set of all elements
appearing in l. This judgement can be defined by structural recursion using
coaxioms as follows:
elems(Λ, ∅)
elems(l, xs)
elems(x::l, {x} ∪ xs)
•
elems(l, ∅)
If we ignore the coaxiom and interpret the system coinductively, then we can
prove elems(l, xs) for any superset xs of the carrier of l if l is infinite. The
coaxioms again allow us to filter out undesired derivations. For instance, for
l the infinite list of 1s, any judgement elems(l, xs) with 1 ∈ xs can be derived.
Indeed, for any such judgement we can construct an infinite proof tree which
is a chain of applications of the last meta-rule. With the coaxioms, we only
consider the infinite trees where the node elems(l, xs) has a finite proof tree in
the inference system enriched by the coaxioms. This is only true for xs = {1}.
We consider now a slight variation of the examples on lists from Section 3.1
allPos(l) and member(x, l). Set B = {T, F}, we would like to define through an
inference system the characteristic functions of those two predicates, that is,
judgements member(x, l, b) and allPos(l, b) with b ∈ B such that
• member(x, l, T) holds iff member(x, l) holds, and otherwise member(x, l, F)
holds
• allPos(l, T) holds iff allPos(l) holds, and otherwise allPos(l, F) holds
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We can define these judgements by means of the following inference systems
with coaxioms
member(x, x::l, T)
member(x, l, b)
member(x, y::l, b)
x 6= y •
member(x, l, F)
allPos(Λ, T) allPos(x::l, F)
x ≤ 0 allPos(l, b)
allPos(x::l, b)
x > 0
•
allPos(l, T)
In these definitions coaxioms are essential, indeed without coaxioms for an
infinite list l we can derive the judgements for any b ∈ B. For instance, if l
is the infinite list of 1s, hence l = 1::l, the following are valid infinite proofs,
obtained repeatedly applying the only rule with non-empty premises
...
member(2, l, T)
member(2, l, T)
...
member(2, l, F)
member(2, l, F)
...
allPos(l, T)
allPos(l, T)
...
allPos(l, F)
allPos(l, F)
In the interpretation generated by coaxioms, only the second and the third
proofs are valid, since their nodes are derivable starting from coaxioms, while
this fact is not true for the others derivations.
4.2 fixed point semantics for coaxioms
In this section we will show that the semantics of an inference system with
coaxioms is indeed a fixed point of the inference operator. Together with this
characterization as fixed point we will also get a proof principle which will be a
generalization of the standard coinduction principle.
4.2.1 Closures and kernels
In this part of the section we will develop yet a little bit of lattice theory, in order
to provide the theoretical background for defining the fixed point semantics of
an inference system with coaxioms. Hence in this part of the section (L, v) will
be a complete lattice (see Definition 2.6) and F : L → L a monotone function
(see Definition 2.3) defined on it. We start introducing some notions which are
slight generalizations of notion that can be found in (Abramsky and Jung, 1994;
Nation, 1998).
Definition 4.2. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice. Then
1. a subset C ⊆ L is a closure system if for any subset X ⊆ C, dX ∈ C
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2. a subset K ⊆ L is a kernel system if for any subset X ⊆ K, ⊔X ∈ K
Note that with the usual convention that
⊔
∅ = ⊥ and d∅ = >, we have
that for all closure systems C ⊆ L, > ∈ C, and for all kernel systems K ⊆ L,
⊥ ∈ K.
This definition provides a general order-theoretic account of a kind of struc-
tures that are very frequent in mathematics, in particular considering the
complete lattice induced by the power-set functor. For instance, as we have
already shown in Section 2.2, given a group G, the set Sub(G) of all subgroups
of G is closed under arbitrary intersections, that is, it is closed under the meet
operation. Hence from the above definition Sub(G) is a closure system in the
complete lattice (℘(G), ⊆). This fact again holds for any algebraic structure.
Another example comes from topology, indeed, given a topological space (X, τ),
by definition τ ⊆ ℘(X) and is closed under arbitrary unions, hence τ is a kernel
system with respect to the complete lattice (℘(X), ⊆). Moreover the set of
closed sets in the topological space (X, τ), that is, the set {X \ A | A ∈ τ}, is
closed under arbitrary intersections, hence it is a closure system. Actually this
is a general fact: if K ⊆ ℘(X) is a kernel system, then {X \ A | A ∈ K} is a
closure system. Also the converse is true.
Rephrasing Proposition 2.5 using this terminology we get that for any mono-
tone function F : L→ L
• pre(F) is a closure system
• post(F) is a kernel system
This observation provides us with a canonical way to associate a closure and a
kernel system to a monotone function. Let us introduce another notion.
Definition 4.3. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice. Then
1. A monotone function ∇ : L → L is a closure operator if it satisfies the
following conditions:
• for all x ∈ L, x v ∇(x)
• for all x ∈ L, ∇(∇(x)) = x
2. A monotone function ∆ : L → L is a kernel operator if it satisfies the
following conditions:
• for all x ∈ L, ∆(x) v x
• for all x ∈ L, ∆(∆(x)) = x
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Note that since a closure operator ∇ : L → L is a monotone function, we
can associate with it both a closure and a kernel system, pre(∇) and post(∇).
However, by the first condition of the definition of closure operator, we get
that post(∇) = L, hence it is not interesting, and pre(∇) = fix(∇). Dually
for a kernel operator ∆ : L → L, only post(∆) = fix(∆) is interesting, because
pre(∆) = L. Therefore we can say that every closure operator naturally induces
a closure system and every kernel operator naturally induces a kernel system.
The next result shows how we can build, in a canonical way, from a closure/k-
ernel system a closure/kernel operator.
Theorem 4.1. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice. Then
1. given a closure system C ⊆ L the function
∇C(x) =
l
{y ∈ C | x v y}
is a closure operator such that fix(∇C) = C
2. given a kernel system K ⊆ L the function
∆K(x) =
⊔{y ∈ K | y v x}
is a kernel operator such that fix(∆K) = K
Proof. We prove only point 1, the proof for the other point is symmetric.
We first prove that ∇C is monotone. Consider x, y ∈ L such that x v y, hence
{z ∈ C | y v z} ⊆ {z ∈ C | x v z}, thus, thanks to a property of d observed in
Section 2.1, ∇C(x) v ∇C(y).
The fact that x v ∇C(x) for all x ∈ L follows from the fact that x is a lower
bound of the set {y ∈ C | x v y}.
Finally note that by definition for all x ∈ L, ∇C(x) ∈ C, hence in order to show
that ∇C(∇C(x)) = ∇C(x) it is enough to show that, for all z ∈ C, ∇C(z) = z,
namely, C ⊆ fix(∇C). So consider z ∈ C, we have already shown that z v ∇C(z),
thus we have only to show the other inequality. Since z ∈ C, z ∈ {y ∈ C | z v y},
and this implies that ∇C(z) v z.
This shows that ∇C is a closure operator. Actually we have also proved
that C ⊆ fix(∇C). Therefore to conclude the proof it remains to show that
fix(∇C) ⊆ C, but this is trivial, since if z = ∇C(z), then z ∈ C by definition.
The above theorem, considered for instance for closure systems, states that
each closure system induces a closure operator having as (pre-)fixed points
exactly the elements in the closure system. Actually we can say even more: each
closure system induces a unique closure operator, that is, each closure operator
is uniquely determined by its (pre-)fixed points.
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Theorem 4.2. Let (L, v) be a complete lattice. Then
• if ∇ : L→ L is a closure operator then ∇fix(∇) = ∇
• if ∆ : L→ L is a kernel operator, then ∆fix(∆) = ∆.
Proof. We prove only point 1, the proof for point 2 is symmetric.
We have to show that ∇(x) = ∇fix(∇)(x) for all x ∈ L. By definition ∇fix(∇) =d
A with A = {y ∈ fix(∇) | x v y}, hence, since x v ∇(x), ∇(x) ∈ A. In order
to conclude the proof we have to show that ∇(x) is the least element of A. To
this aim, consider y = ∇(y) ∈ A and prove that it is above ∇(x). Note that
x v y, hence, by monotonicity of ∇, ∇(x) v ∇(y) = y, as needed.
In other words the above theorem tells us that to define a closure or kernel
operator it is enough to specify a closure or a kernel system. Therefore, for
instance, the closure system Sub(G), where G is a group, induces the closure
operator 〈−〉 : ℘(G) → ℘(G), that computes for any set X ⊆ G the subgroup
generated by X. For a topological space (X, τ) we have that the topology τ
induces a kernel operator that, for any set A ⊆ X, computes its interior, and the
set of closed sets {X \ A | A ∈ τ} induces the topological closure operator.
4.2.2 The bounded fixed point
Let us now consider a monotone function F : L → L. As we have seen, we
can associate with F both a closure and a kernel system, pre(F) and post(F)
respectively. Thanks to Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 we know that these
systems induce a unique closure and kernel operator respectively, defined
below
∇F(x) = ∇pre(F) =
l
{y ∈ pre(F) | x v y}
∆F(x) = ∆post(F) =
⊔{y ∈ post(F) | y v x}
We call ∇F the closure of F and ∆F the kernel of F. Intuitively, ∇F(x) is the best
pre-fixed approximation of x (the least pre-fixed point above x), while ∆F(x)
is the best post-fixed approximation of x (the greatest post-fixed point below
x). In this part of the section we will study some properties of these operators
related to fixed points constructions.
First of all we note that from the definitions of the closure and the kernel of
F we can immediately derive a generalization of both the induction and the
coinduction principles described in Section 2.3. Given γ, β ∈ L, for all x ∈ L we
have
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(ind) if F(x) v x (x pre-fixed) and γ v x, then ∇F(γ) v x
(coind) if x v F(x) (x post-fixed) and x v β, then x v ∆F(β)
These two principles are a generalization of standard induction and coinduction
principles, because we can retrieve them through particular choices for γ and
β. Indeed, if γ = ⊥, the condition γ v x is trivially always true, and we
have ∇F(⊥) =
d
pre(F) = µF by Knaster-Tarski (Theorem 2.4), hence (Ind)
allows us to conclude µF v x like standard induction requiring the same
hypothesis. Dually if β = >, again the condition x v β is trivially always
true, and ∆F(>)⊔ post(F) = νF by Knaster-Tarski, hence (CoInd) allows us to
conclude x v νF like standard coinduction requiring the same hypothesis.
We now prove a result ensuring us that under suitable hypotheses we can
use the closure and the kernel of a monotone function to build a fixed point of
that function.
Proposition 4.1. Let γ, β ∈ L. Then
1. if β is a pre-fixed point, then ∆F(β) is a fixed point
2. if γ is post-fixed point, then ∇F(γ) is a fixed point
Proof. We will prove only point 1, the proof for point 2 is symmetric.
As we noticed in Section 2.2 ↓ β is a complete lattice; moreover by Proposition 2.4
the function F : ↓ β→ ↓ β is well-defined and monotone, since β is a pre-fixed
point. Therefore ∆F(β) is the join of all post-fixed points of F in the complete
lattice ↓ β, hence by Theorem 2.4 it is a fixed point.
Therefore we now know that if β is pre-fixed ∆F(β) is the greatest fixed point
below β, and, if γ is post-fixed, then ∇F(γ) is the least fixed point above γ.
We are now able to define the bounded fixed point.
Definition 4.4 (Bounded fixed point). Let γ ∈ L. The bounded fixed point of F
generated by γ, denoted by Gen(F,γ), is the greatest fixed point of F below the
closure of γ, that is, Gen(F,γ) = ∆F(∇F(γ)).
The bounded fixed point is well-defined since, thanks to Proposition 4.1,
there exists the greatest fixed point below β, provided that the bound β is a
pre-fixed point. Since in general γ might not be pre-fixed, we need to construct
a pre-fixed point from γ. Note that the first step of this construction cannot
be expressed as the least fixed point of F on the complete lattice ↑ γ, since in
general F may fail to be well-defined (e.g., if F is the function which maps any
4.2 fixed point semantics for coaxioms 59
element to ⊥ v γ with γ 6= ⊥). Indeed, ∇F(γ) is not a fixed point in general,
but only a pre-fixed point: we need the two steps to obtain a fixed point.
Note also that the definition of bounded fixed point is asymmetric, that is,
we take the greatest fixed point bounded from above by a least pre-fixed point,
rather than the other way round. This is motivated by the intuition, explained
in Section 4.1, that we essentially need a greatest fixed point, since we want to
deal with non-well-founded structures, but we want to “constrain” in some way
such greatest fixed point. Investigating the symmetric construction (∇F(∆F(γ)))
is a matter of further work.
The following proposition states some immediate properties of the bounded
fixed point.
Proposition 4.2.
1. If z ∈ L is a fixed point of F, then Gen(F, z) = z.
2. For all γ1,γ2 ∈ L, if γ1 v γ2, then Gen(F,γ1) v Gen(F,γ2).
Proof.
1. If z is a fixed point, then it is both pre-fixed and post-fixed, hence ∇F(z) =
z and ∆F(z) = z. Thus we get that Gen(F, z) = ∆F(∇F(z)) = ∆F(z) = z.
2. Since both closure and kernel operators are monotone we get that γ1 v
γ2 ⇒ ∇F(γ1) v ∇F(γ2) ⇒ ∆F(∇F(γ1)) v ∆F(∇F(γ2)) ⇒ Gen(F, (γ1) v
Gen(F,γ2).
Therefore, by Proposition 4.1 we already know that Gen(F,γ) is a fixed point
for any γ ∈ L; the first point of the above proposition says that all fixed points
of F can be generated as bounded fixed points. In other words, considering
Gen(F,−) as a function from L into itself, the first point implies that the range of
this function is exactly fix(F). Moreover the second point states that Gen(F,−)
is a monotone function on L.
An important fact is that bounded fixed points are a generalization of both
least and greatest fixed points, since they can be obtained by taking particular
generators, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.
1. Gen(F,>) is the greatest fixed point of F
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2. Gen(F,⊥) is the least fixed point of F
Proof.
1. Note that ∇F(>) = >, since the only pre-fixed point above > is > itself,
hence we get Gen(F,>) = ∆F(>) = ⊔ post(F) = νF,
2. As already noted ∇F(⊥) = µF, in particular ∇F(⊥) is post-fixed, therefore
we get Gen(F,⊥) = ∆F(∇F(⊥)) = ∇F(⊥), namely it is the least fixed point
of F.
An alternative proof for the above proposition is possible by exploiting
Proposition 4.2. We preferred to give the above proof, since this follows the
asymmetry of the definition of the bounded fixed point.
We now present a result that will be particularly useful to develop proof
techniques for the bounded fixed point (see Section 4.4). Recall from Section 2.4
that IF,x denotes the set {Fn(x) | n ∈ N} where F0 = idL and Fn+1 = F ◦ Fn.
Moreover from Lemma 2.1 we know that if x is either pre-fixed or post-fixed,
IF,x is a chain (see Definition 2.8) and in particular a descending chain if x is
pre-fixed.
Proposition 4.4. Let β ∈ L be a pre-fixed point of F. Then
1. for all n ∈N, ∆F(β) = ∆F(Fn(β))
2. ∆F(β) = ∆F(
d
IF,β)
Proof. Note that since β is pre-fixed, IF,β is a descending chain, hence for all
n ∈N we have Fn+1(β) v Fn(β), that is, Fn(β) is a pre-fixed point for all n ∈N.
1. We prove the statement by induction on n. If n = 0 there is nothing
to prove. Now, assume the thesis for n. By definition ∆F(Fn(β)) is a
post-fixed point, hence ∆F(Fn(β)) v F(∆F(Fn(β))). Since ∆F is a kernel
operator, by Definition 4.3, we have ∆F(Fn(β)) v Fn(β), hence by the
monotonicity of F, we get F(∆F(Fn(β))) v Fn+1(β). Now by transitivity
of v we get ∆F(Fn(β)) v Fn+1(β). Therefore by (CoInd) we conclude
∆F(Fn(β)) v ∆F(Fn+1(β)).
On the other hand, since Fn(β) is pre-fixed, we have Fn+1(β) v Fn(β).
Thus by the monotonicity of ∆F we get the other inequality, and this im-
plies ∆F(Fn(β)) = ∆F(Fn+1(β)). Finally thanks to the inductive hypothesis
we get the thesis.
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2. By point 1 we have ∆F(β) v Fn(β) for all n ∈ N, hence ∆F(β) v
d
IF,β.
Therefore by (CoInd) we get ∆F(β) v ∆F(
d
IF,β). On the other hand, we
have
d
IF,β v β, hence, by monotonicity of ∆F, we get the other inequality,
and this implies the thesis.
Another way to read the above proposition is that, given a bound β which is
pre-fixed, we obtain the same greatest fixed point below β if we take as bound
any element Fn(β) of the descending chain IF,β. Moreover, Proposition 4.4 says
also that we obtain the same greatest fixed point induced by β if we take as
bound the greatest lower bound of that chain, namely,
d
IF,β.
We conclude this part of the section with a result that characterizes the closure
and the kernel of respectively a post-fixed and a pre-fixed point using chains in
analogy with the Kleene theorem (Theorem 2.5).
Proposition 4.5. Let β,γ ∈ L be a pre-fixed and a post-fixed point respectively.
Then
1. if F is downward continuous, then ∆F(β) =
d
IF,β
2. if F is upward continuous, then ∇F(γ) = ⊔ IF,γ
Proof. We prove only point 1, the proof for point 2 is symmetric.
As we noticed in Section 2.2 ↓ β is a complete lattice with top element β; more-
over by Proposition 2.4 the function F : ↓ β→ ↓ β is well-defined and monotone,
since β is a pre-fixed point. In this case it is also downward continuous, because
so is F. Therefore by Proposition 4.1, ∆F(β) is the greatest fixed point of F in the
complete lattice ↓ β, hence, since F is downward continuous, we get the thesis
by Theorem 2.5.
Note that the above proposition requires an additional hypothesis on F, that
is required to be continuous, as happens for the Kleene theorem (Theorem 2.5).
Under this assumption the above result immediately applies to the bounded
fixed point, providing us with an iterative characterization of it, as the following
corollary shows.
Corollary 4.1. Let γ ∈ L and set β = ∇F(γ). If F is downward continuous,
then Gen(F,γ) =
d
IF,β.
Proof. By Definition 4.4 we have Gen(F,γ) = ∆F(β). Since F is downward
continuous, by Proposition 4.5 we get the thesis.
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4.2.3 Coaxioms as generators
In this part of the section we come back to inference systems and we show
that the interpretation generated by coaxioms of an inference system is indeed
a fixed point of the inference operator. In Section 4.1 we have described two
steps to construct Gen(I ,γ), the interpretation generated by coaxioms γ of an
inference system I .
1. First, we consider the inference system Iunionsqγ obtained enriching I by judge-
ments in γ considered as axioms, and we take its inductive interpretation
Ind(Iunionsqγ).
2. Then, we take the coinductive interpretation of the inference system
obtained from I by keeping only rules with consequence in Ind(Iunionsqγ), that
is, we define
Gen(I ,γ) = CoInd(IuInd(Iunionsqγ))
The definition of bounded fixed point is the formulation of these two steps
in the general setting of complete lattices. Indeed, the inference operator FI
is a monotone function on the complete lattice (℘(U ), ⊆) obtained by taking
set inclusion as order, and specifying the coaxioms γ corresponds to fixing an
arbitrary element of L as generator. Then:
1. First, we construct the closure of γ, that is, the best closed approximation
of γ. This closure plays the role of bound for the next step.
2. Then we construct the greatest fixed point below such bound.
To show the correspondence in a precise way, we give an alternative and
equivalent characterization of both the closure and the kernel of an element in
L.
Proposition 4.6. Let γ, β ∈ L.
1. Consider the function Funionsqγ : L → L defined by Funionsqγ(x) = F(x) unionsq γ. Then
∇F(γ) = µFunionsqγ.
2. Consider the function Fuβ : L → L defined by Fuβ(x) = F(x) u β. Then
∆F(β) = νFuβ.
Proof. Note that both Funionsqγ and Fuβ are clearly monotone, hence the statements
make sense, because Theorem 2.4 ensures the existence of both the least and
the greatest fixed point of a monotone function.
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1. By definition of fixed point we have that µFunionsqγ = Funionsqγ(µFunionsqγ) = F(µFunionsqγ) unionsq
γ, hence, by definition of unionsq, we get γ v µFunionsqγ and F(µFunionsqγ) v µFunionsqγ.
Therefore by (Ind) we get ∇F(γ) v µFunionsqγ.
On the other hand, by definition of ∇F, we have that F(∇F(γ)) v ∇F(γ)
and γ v ∇F(γ). Therefore, by definition of unionsq, we get that Funionsqγ(∇F(γ)) =
F(∇F(γ)) unionsq γ v ∇F(γ), hence by the induction principle we get µFunionsqγ v
∇F(γ).
Finally by antisymmetry we get the thesis.
2. By definition of fixed point we have that νFuβ = Fuβ(νFuβ) = F(νFuβ)u β,
hence, by definition of u, we get that νFuβ v β and νFuβ v F(νFuβ).
Therefore by (CoInd) we get νFuβ v ∆F(β).
On the other hand, by definition of ∆F, we have that ∆F(β) v F(∆F(β))
and ∆F(β) v β. Therefore, by definition of u, we get that ∆F(β) v
F(∆F(β)) u β = Fuβ(∆F(β)), hence by the coinduction principle we get
that ∆F(β) v νFuβ.
Finally by antisymmetry we get the thesis.
By this alternative characterization we can formally state the correspondence
with the two steps for defining Gen(I ,γ).
Theorem 4.3. Let I be an inference system and γ, β ∈ ℘(U ), then the following
facts hold:
1. (FI)unionsqγ = F(Iunionsqγ) (so we can safely omit brackets)
2. (FI)uβ = F(Iuβ) (so we can safely omit brackets)
3. ∇FI (γ) = Ind(Iunionsqγ)
4. ∆FI (β) = CoInd(Iuβ)
Proof. 1. We have to show that, for S ⊆ U , (FI)unionsqγ(S) = F(Iunionsqγ)(S). If c ∈
(FI)unionsqγ(S), then either c ∈ γ or c ∈ FI(S); in the former case there exists
c
∈ Iunionsqγ by definition of Iunionsqγ, in the latter there exists Prc ∈ I such that
Pr ⊆ S, and this implies Pr
c
∈ Iunionsqγ. Therefore in both cases c ∈ F(Iunionsqγ)(S).
Conversely, if c ∈ F(Iunionsqγ)(S), then there exists
Pr
c
∈ Iunionsqγ such that Pr ⊆ S.
By definition of Iunionsqγ, either Prc ∈ I or c ∈ γ and Pr = ∅, therefore in
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the former case c ∈ FI(S) and in the latter c ∈ γ, thus in both cases
c ∈ (FI)unionsqγ(S).
2. We have to show that, for S ⊆ U , (FI)uβ(S) = F(Iuβ)(S). If c ∈ (FI)uβ(S),
then we have c ∈ β and c ∈ FI(S), hence there is Prc ∈ I such that Pr ⊆ S;
therefore, by definition of Iuβ, we get Prc ∈ Iuβ, and this implies that
c ∈ F(Iuβ)(S).
Conversely, if c ∈ F(Iuβ)(S), then there exists
Pr
c
∈ Iuβ such that Pr ⊆ S.
By definition of Iuβ, we have that Prc ∈ I and c ∈ β, therefore c ∈ FI(S)
and c ∈ β, thus c ∈ (FI)uβ(S).
3. By Proposition 4.6 we get that ∇FI (γ) = µFIunionsqγ, that corresponds to the
inductive interpretation of Iunionsqγ, Ind(Iunionsqγ), by Theorem 3.2 and point 1 of this
theorem.
4. By Proposition 4.6 we get that ∆FI (β) = νFIuβ, that corresponds to the
coinductive interpretation of Iuβ, CoInd(Iuβ), by Theorem 3.3 and point 2
of this theorem.
Thanks to Theorem 4.3, we can conclude that, given an inference system with
coaxioms (I , γ):
Gen(I ,γ) = CoInd(IuInd(Iunionsqγ)) = ∆FI (∇FI (γ)) = Gen(FI ,γ)
that is, the interpretation generated by coaxioms γ of the inference system I is
exactly the bounded fixed point of FI generated by γ.
Finally applying Proposition 4.3 we get that the inductive and the coinductive
interpretations of I are particular cases of the interpretation generated by
coaxioms. Indeed we get the inductive interpretation when γ = ∅ and we get
the coinductive interpretation when γ = U , as shown below.
Gen(I ,∅) = Gen(FI ,∅) = µFI = Ind(I)
Gen(I ,U ) = Gen(FI ,U ) = νFI = CoInd(I)
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4.3 proof trees for coaxioms
In this section we formalize several proof-theoretic characterizations for the
semantics of inference systems with coaxioms, proving their equivalence with
the fixed point semantics presented in Section 4.2. All presented proof-theoretic
characterizations are based on the notion of proof tree introduced in Defini-
tion 3.4.
The first characterization is based on the following theorem which slightly
generalizes the standard result about the correspondence between the fixed
point and the proof-theoretic semantics of inference systems in the coinductive
case (see Theorem 3.3).
Theorem 4.4. Let I be an inference system and β ⊆ U a closed set of judge-
ments. Then for all j ∈ U the following are equivalent:
1. j ∈ ∆FI (β)
2. there exists a proof tree t for j in I such that each node of t is (labelled) in
β
Proof. By Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 3.3 we have that ∆FI (β) = νFIuβ =
CoInd(Iuβ). Hence j ∈ ∆FI (β) iff there exists a proof tree t for j in Iuβ. By
Definition 3.4 every node in t is (labelled by) a consequence c of a rule in Iuβ,
hence c ∈ β, by definition of Iuβ.
As a particular case we get our first proof-theoretic characterization of
Gen(I ,γ).
Corollary 4.2. Let (I , γ) be an inference system with coaxioms. Then the
following are equivalent
1. j ∈ Gen(I ,γ)
2. there exists a proof tree t for j in I such that each node of t has a well-
founded proof tree in Iunionsqγ
Proof. We have that Gen(I ,γ) = ∆FI (Ind(Iunionsqγ)), hence by Theorem 4.4 we get
that j ∈ Gen(I ,γ) iff there is a proof tree t for j in I whose nodes are all in
Ind(Iunionsqγ). Therefore all nodes of t have a well-founded proof tree in Iunionsqγ by
Definition 3.5.
For the second proof-theoretic characterization, we need to define approximated
proof trees in an inference system with coaxioms. In the definition below we
write tj to denote an arbitrary tree rooted in j.
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Definition 4.5. Let (I , γ) be an inference system with coaxioms, the sets Tn of
approximated proof trees of level n in (I , γ), for n ∈N, are inductively defined as
follows:
t ∈ T0 if t well-founded proof tree in Iunionsqγ
T
c
∈ Tn+1 if Prc ∈ I and T ={tj | j ∈ Tn ∈ Pr}⊆Tn
Note that an approximated proof tree is actually a proof tree, since the set T
and the set Pr in the inductive step are in bijection: elements tj in T are indexed
by judgements in Pr, hence there is a surjective map from Pr to T ; moreover, if
tj = tj′ , then j = tj(ε) = tj′(ε) = tj′ , hence this map is also injective.
In other words, an approximated proof tree of level n in (I , γ) is a well-
founded proof tree in Iunionsqγ where coaxioms can only be used at depth ≥ n.
Therefore if t ∈ Tn is an approximated proof tree of level n, then, for all
α ∈ dom(t) with |α| < n, t(α) is the consequence of a rule in I , more precisely
{t(β) | β ∈ chl(α)}
t(α)
∈ I .
Another simple property of approximated proof trees is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.7. If t ∈ Tn, α ∈ dom(t) and |α| = k ≤ n, then tα ∈ Tn−k.
Proof. We proceed by induction on |α|. If |α| = 0, then α = ε, hence tε = t ∈ Tn.
Assume |α| = k + 1, hence α = βa, hence β ∈ dom(t) and |β| = k. Therefore by
inductive hypothesis tβ ∈ Tn−k, hence tα = tβa ∈ dsub(tβ), and this implies, by
Definition 4.5, that tα ∈ Tn−k−1.
The following theorem states that approximated proof trees of level n cor-
respond to the n-th element of the descending chain IFI ,β = {FnI(β) | n ∈ N},
with β = ∇FI (γ) = Ind(Iunionsqγ).
Theorem 4.5. Let (I , γ) be an inference system with coaxioms, and j ∈ U a
judgement. We have that, for all n ∈N, the following are equivalent:
1. j ∈ FnI(∇FI (γ))
2. j has an approximated proof tree of level n in (I , γ)
Proof. Let β be ∇FI (γ). We prove the thesis by induction on n.
base If n = 0, then, by Theorem 4.3, β = ∇FI (γ) corresponds to the inductive
interpretation of Iunionsqγ, hence the equivalence holds by Definition 3.5.
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induction We assume the equivalence for n and prove it for n + 1. We prove
separately the two implications.
1⇒ 2 If c ∈ Fn+1I (β), then there exists
Pr
c
∈ I such that Pr ⊆ FnI(β).
Hence, by inductive hypothesis, each judgement in Pr has an approx-
imated proof tree of level n, that is, for all j ∈ Pr there is an approx-
imated proof tree tj ∈ Tn rooted in j. Set T = {tj ∈ Tn | j ∈ Pr}.
Hence, t =
T
c
is a proof tree for c, and by Definition 4.5, t ∈ Tn+1.
2⇒ 1 If t ∈ Tn+1 is an approximated proof tree for c ∈ U , then, by
definition, there exists
Pr
c
∈ I such that t = T
c
, T = {tj ∈ Tn |
j ∈ Pr}, and T ⊆ Tn, where tj is a tree rooted in j. By inductive
hypothesis we have Pr ⊆ FnI(β), and, by definition of FI , this implies
c ∈ Fn+1I (β) as needed.
The second proof-theoretic characterization of the interpretation generated
by coaxioms is an immediate consequence of the above theorem.
Corollary 4.3. Let (I , γ) be an inference system with coaxioms, and j ∈ U a
judgement. Then the following are equivalent:
1. j ∈ Gen(I ,γ)
2. there exists a proof tree t for j in I such that each node of t has an
approximated proof tree of level n in (I , γ), for all n ∈N.
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, Proposition 4.4, and Theorem 4.4, we get that, for all
j ∈ U , j ∈ Gen(I ,γ) iff there exists a proof tree t for j in I such that each node
j′ of t is in
⋂
IFI ,β with β = ∇FI (γ). By Theorem 4.5, j′ ∈
⋂
IFI ,β iff has an
approximated proof tree of level n, for all n ∈N.
If the hypotheses of Corollary 4.1 are satisfied, then we get a simpler equiva-
lent proof-theoretic characterization.
Corollary 4.4. Let (I , γ) be an inference system with coaxioms, and j ∈ U a
judgement. If FI is downward continuous, then the following are equivalent:
1. j ∈ Gen(I ,γ)
2. j has an approximated proof tree of level n in (I , γ), for all n ∈N.
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Proof. Let β be the set ∇FI (γ). By Theorem 4.3 and Corollary 4.1, we get that
Gen(I ,γ) = ⋂ IFI ,β, therefore the thesis follows immediately from Theorem 4.5.
In order to define the last proof-theoretic characterization (Theorem 4.8),
we need to introduce a richer structure on trees. In particular we will define
a partial order on T(L) which is a slight relaxation of the canonical order
introduced in (Courcelle, 1983).
Consider trees t, t′ ∈ T(L) we define
t / t′ ⇐⇒ dom(t) ⊆ dom(t′) and ∀α ∈ dom(t). t(α) = t′(α)
It is easy to see that / is a partial order, actually it is function inclusion. Indeed,
reflexivity and transitivity follow from the same properties of ⊆ and =, and
aantisymmetry can be proved noting that if t / t′ and t′ / t we have that dom(t) =
(t′) (by antisymmetry of ⊆) and t(α) = t′(α) for all α ∈ dom(t), hence t = t′.
Intuitively, t / t′ means that t can be obtained from t′ by pruning some
branches. Alternatively, considering trees as graphs, t / t′ means that t is a
subgraph of t′. In any case / expresses a very strong relation among trees,
actually too strong for our aims, hence we need to relax it a little bit.
We relax it by considering what we call its n-th approximation, defined below.
Given a tree t, we denote by domn(t) the set {α ∈ dom(t) | |α| ≤ n}. The n-th
approximation of /, denoted by /n, is defined as follows:
t /n t′ ⇐⇒ domn(t) ⊆ domn(t′) and ∀α ∈ domn(t). t(α) = t′(α)
Intuitively /n is identical to /, but limited to nodes at level ≤ n. We call it the
n-th approximation of / since /n is coarser than /,namely, if t / t′ then t /n t′
for all n ∈N. Actually we can say even more: t / t′ if and only if t /n t′ for all
n ∈N. Moreover if t /n t′ then for all k ≤ n we have t /k t′, that is, /n is a finer
approximation than /k. In the end note that /n is reflexive and transitive, but it
fails to be antisymmetric, because we compare only node until level n, hence
we cannot conclude an equality between the whole trees.
We now state a result that is crucial for our proof-theoretic characterization.
Theorem 4.6. Let (tn)n∈N be a sequence of trees, such that, for all n ∈ N,
tn /n tn+1. Then, there exists a tree t such that ∀n ∈ N. tn /n t, and, for any
other tree t′ such that ∀n ∈N. tn /n t′, we have t / t′.
Proof. We define the function t : L → L where L = ⋃n∈N domn(tn) and for all
α ∈ L, t(α) = tk(α)(α), where k(α) = min Dα with Dα = {n ∈N | α ∈ domn(tn)}.
4.3 proof trees for coaxioms 69
Note that k(α) is well-defined, because Dα 6= ∅, since α ∈ L and, by construc-
tion of L, there is at least an index n ∈N such that α ∈ domn(tn). Moreover L
is a tree language, since if αa ∈ L, then αa ∈ domn(tn) for some n ∈N, that is a
tree language, hence α ∈ domn(tn) ⊆ L. Therefore t is a tree.
Fix now n ∈ N, we have to show that tn /n t. By construction we have
domn(tn) ⊆ domn(t), and if α ∈ domn(tn), then by construction k(α) ≤ n.
Therefore we have that tk(α) /k(α) tn, hence tk(α)(α) = tn(α), thus t(α) = tn(α)
and this implies tn /n t.
Consider now a tree t′ such that ∀n ∈ N. tn /n t′. Therefore we have that
for all n ∈ N, domn(tn) ⊆ domn(t′) ⊆ dom(t′), hence dom(t) ⊆ dom(t′). Then,
if α ∈ dom(t), there is n ∈ N such that α ∈ domn(tn) and t(α) = tn(α). Since
tn /n t′, we have that tn(α) = t′(α), hence t(α) = t′(α) and this implies t / t′.
It is easy to see that a tree t having the property expressed in the above
theorem is unique. Indeed, if t and t′ have that property for a sequence (tn)n∈N,
then we have both t / t′ and t′ / t, hence t = t′. Therefore we denote such a tree
by
∨
n∈N tn.
The above theorem ensures the existence of a sort of least upper bound of
an ascending chain of trees:
∨
n∈N tn behaves like a least upper bound, but for
approximations of a partial order. However, since /n is an approximation of
/, it can by shown that if (tn)n∈N is a chain with respect to /, then
∨
n∈N tn is
indeed the least upper bound of the chain, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5. Let (tn)n∈N be a sequence of trees, such that for all n ∈ N,
tn / tn+1. Then,
∨
n∈N tn is the least upper bound of the sequence (tn)n∈N.
Proof. Since /n is an approximation of / we have that tn /n tn+1 for all n ∈ N.
Setting t =
∨
n∈N tn, by Theorem 4.6, we get tn /n t for all n ∈ N. We have
to show that t is an upper bound of (tn)n∈N, hence consider α ∈ dom(tn) and
suppose |α| = k. We have two cases:
• if k ≤ n, then α ∈ domn(tn), hence α ∈ domn(t) ⊆ dom(t) and tn(α) = t(α)
• if k > n, then, since tn / tk, α ∈ domk(tk) ⊆ domk(t) ⊆ dom(t), and
tn(α) = tk(α) = t(α)
Therefore we get tn / t.
To show that t is the least upper bound, consider an upper bound t′, hence
tn / t′ for all n ∈ N, and this implies that tn /n t′ for all n ∈ N. Therefore, by
Theorem 4.6, we get t / t′.
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We now consider the equivalence relations induced by each /n, defined as
follows:
t ./n t′ ⇐⇒ t /n t′ and t′ /n t
or, more explicitly:
t ./n t′ ⇐⇒ domn(t) = domn(t′) and ∀α ∈ domn(t). t(α) = t′(α)
These equivalence relations are an approximation of the equality relation, indeed
t = t′ if and only if t ./n t′ for all n ∈N.
The relations /n and ./n look very similar: they are both an approximation
of another relation, they are both reflexive and transitive and they both do not
care about levels higher than n. However, the fact that ./n is an equivalence
relation makes it different. Indeed, if t ./n t′, then the first n levels of t and t′
are forced to be equal, while, if t /n t′, then the first n levels of t′ must contain
also those of t, but can have also additional branches. In other words, with ./n
we can change only the depth of the trees, while with /n we can change both
the depth and the breadth.
As a consequence of Theorem 4.6 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. Let (tn)n∈N be a sequence of trees, such that, for all n ∈ N,
tn ./n tn+1. Then, there exists a unique tree t such that ∀n ∈N. tn ./n t.
Proof. By definition of ./n we have that tn /n tn+1 and tn+1 /n tn for all n ∈ N.
Therefore, by Theorem 4.6, we get that there is a tree t =
∨
n∈N tn such that, for
all n ∈N, tn /n t, hence we have only to prove that t /n tn and that t is unique.
Since we know that domn(tn) ⊆ domn(t) and for all α ∈ domn(tn), tn(α) = t(α),
it is enough to show that domn(t) ⊆ domn(tn). Thus, consider α ∈ domn(t). By
construction of t (see the proof of Theorem 4.6), there is an index k ∈N such
that α ∈ domk(tk). We have two cases:
• If k ≤ n, then by hypothesis domk(tk) ⊆ domk(tn) ⊆ domn(tn), hence
α ∈ domn(tn).
• Otherwise, that is, if n < k, since α ∈ domn(t), we have |α| ≤ n < k, hence
α ∈ domn(tk) ⊆ domn(tn), because, by hypothesis tn ./n tk.
Therefore we have domn(t) ⊆ domn(tn) as needed.
To prove that t is unique, consider a tree t′ such that tn ./n t′ for all n ∈ N,
by transitivity we get t ./n t′ for all n ∈N, and this implies t = t′.
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It is well known that trees carry a complete metric space structure (Arnold
and Nivat, 1980; Courcelle, 1983) and, even if our notion of tree is more general
than that adopted in these works, we can recover the same metric on our trees,
using the equivalence relations introduced earlier. The metric is defined as
follows:
d(t, t′) = 2−h h = min{n ∈N | t 6./n t′}
with assumptions min∅ = ∞ and w−∞ = 0. It is easy to see that a sequence
(tn)n∈N such that tn ./n tn+1, like that considered in Theorem 4.7, is a Cauchy
sequence in the metric space; indeed d(tn, tn+1) ≤ 2−n. Therefore such se-
quences converge also in the metric space, and the limit is the same. However
our notion of convergence seems to be more general: sequences like those con-
sidered in Theorem 4.6 are not necessarily Cauchy sequences, but they admit a
limit in our framework. For instance consider the sequence (tn)n∈N of children
injective trees labelled on N and rooted in 0 is, defined1 by
dom(t0) = {ε} dom(tn+1) = dom(tn) ∪ {n}
It is easy to check that tn /n tn+1, hence, by Theorem 4.6, it converges to
∨
n∈N tn.
However, it is not a Cauchy sequence, since d(tn, tn+1) = 2−1 for all n ∈N, and∨
n∈N tn is not a limit of the sequence in the metric space. A deeper comparison
between these relations and the standard metric structure on trees will be matter
of further work.
We can now introduce the concept that will allow the last proof-theoretic
characterization.
Definition 4.6. Let (I , γ) be an inference system with coaxioms and j ∈ U a
judgement. Then:
1. An approximating proof sequence for j is a sequence of proof trees (tn)n∈N
for j such that tn ∈ Tn and tn /n tn+1 for all n ∈N.
2. A strong approximating proof sequence for j is a sequence of proof trees
(tn)n∈N for j such that tn ∈ Tn and tn ./n tn+1 for all n ∈N.
Obviously every strong approximating proof sequence is also an approximat-
ing proof sequence. Note also that all trees in these sequences are well-founded
proof trees in Iunionsqγ. Intuitively, both notions represent the growth of a proof
for j in I approximated using coaxioms. The difference is that trees in an
approximating proof sequence can grow both in depth and in breadth, while in
1 It is enough to provide a definition for the domain since trees are children injective.
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a strong approximating proof sequence they can grow only in depth. We now
prove our last theorem.
Theorem 4.8. Let (I , γ) be an inference system with coaxioms and j ∈ U a
judgement. Then the following are equivalent
1. j ∈ Gen(I ,γ)
2. j has a strong approximating proof sequence
3. j has an approximating proof sequence
Proof.
1⇒ 2 We define trees tj,n for j ∈ Gen(I ,γ) and n ∈ N such that tj,n(ε) = j
by induction on n. By Corollary 4.2 we know that every judgement
j ∈ Gen(I ,γ) has a well-founded proof tree in Iunionsqγ, that is, a proof tree
in T0 rooted in j: we select one of these trees and call it tj,0. Furthermore,
since Gen(I ,γ) is a post-fixed point, for any j ∈ Gen(I ,γ) we can select a
rule
Prj
j
∈ I with Prj ⊆ Gen(I ,γ); hence tj,n+1 can be defined as follows:
tj,n+1 =
{tj′,n | j′ ∈ Prj}
j
Clearly by construction for all j ∈ Gen(I ,γ) and for all n ∈ N, tj,n ∈ Tn.
We show by induction on n that for all n ∈ N and for all j ∈ Gen(I ,γ),
tj,n ./n tj,n+1.
base If n = 0, then dom0(tj,0) = dom0(tj,1) = {ε} and by construction
tj,0(ε) = tj,1(ε) = j, hence tj,0 ./0 tj,1.
induction We assume the thesis for n − 1 and prove it for n, hence
we have to show that tj,n ./n tj,n+1. By construction we have tj,n =
{tj′,n−1 | j′ ∈ Prj}
j
and tj,n+1 =
{tj′,n | j′ ∈ Prj}
j
. By inductive hypoth-
esis we get tj′,n−1 ./n−1 tj′,n for all j′ ∈ Prj. Therefore we have
domn(tj,n) = {ε} ∪
⋃
j′∈Prj
j′domn−1(tj′,n−1)
= {ε} ∪ ⋃
j′∈Prj
j′domn−1(tj′,n)
= domn(tj,n+1)
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Consider now α ∈ domn(tj,n), we have two cases:
α = ε tj,n(α) = j = tj,n+1(α)
α = j′β, j′ ∈ Prj tj,n(α) = tj′,n−1(β) = tj′,n(β) = tj,n+1(α)
and this shows tj,n ./n tj,n+1 as needed.
2⇒ 3 Trivial, by Definition 4.6.
3⇒ 1 By Theorem 4.6 we know that there is a tree t such that tn /n t for all
n ∈N. We show that t is a proof tree in I for j. Obviously j = t0(ε) = t(ε).
Consider α ∈ dom(t), then, by construction of t, there are natural number
m, n ∈N such that α ∈ domm(tm) and chl(α) ⊆ domn(tn) with |α| < m ≤ n.
Therefore, since tm /m tn, we get α ∈ domm(tn) ⊆ domn(tn). Since tn ∈ Tn
and |α| < n the rule {t(β) | β ∈ chl(α)}
t(α)
is a rule in I by Definition 4.5,
thus t is a proof tree in I .
Now consider a node α ∈ dom(t), then there is k ∈ N such that α ∈
domk(tk), and so |α| ≤ k and α ∈ domm(tm) for all m ≥ k. We define
the sequence (tαn)n∈N such that tαn = tn+kα. By Proposition 4.7 we get
tαn ∈ Tn+k−|α| ⊆ Tn. This observation shows that every node in t has an
approximated proof tree of level n for all n ∈ N, hence by Theorem 4.5
we get j ∈ Gen(I ,γ).
4.4 reasoning with coaxioms
In this section we discuss proof techniques for inference systems with coaxioms.
Assume that D = Gen(I ,γ) (for ”defined”) is the interpretation generated by
coaxioms for some (I , γ), and that S (for “specification”) is the intended set of
judgements, called valid in the following.
Typically, we are interested in proving S ⊆ D (completeness, that is, each valid
judgement can be derived) and/or D ⊆ S (soundness, that is, each derivable
judgement is valid). Proving both properties amounts to say that the inference
system with coaxioms actually defines the intended set of judgements.
In the following, set β = ∇FI (γ) = Ind(Iunionsqγ).
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completeness proofs To show completeness, we can use (CoInd). Indeed,
since D = ∆FI (β), if S ⊆ β and S is a post-fixed point of FI , by (CoInd) we
get that S ⊆ D. That is, using the notations of inference systems, to prove
completeness it is enough to show that:
• S ⊆ Ind(Iunionsqγ)
• S ⊆ FI(S)
We call this principle the bounded coinduction principle.
We illustrate the technique on the inference system with coaxioms (I , γ)
which defines the judgement allPos(l, b) (see Section 4.1). Let SallPos be the set
of judgements allPos(l, b) where b is T if all the elements in l are positive, F
otherwise. Completeness means that the judgement allPos(l, b) can be proved,
for all allPos(l, b) ∈ SallPos. By the bounded coinduction principle, it is enough
to show that
• SallPos ⊆ Ind(Iunionsqγ)
• SallPos ⊆ FI(SallPos)
To prove the first condition, we have to show that, for each allPos(l, b) ∈ SallPos,
allPos(l, b) has a finite proof tree in Iunionsqγ. This can be easily shown, indeed:
• If l contains a (first) non-positive element, hence
l = x1::. . .::xn::x::l′ with xi > 0 for i ∈ [1..n], x ≤ 0, and b = F
then we can reason by arithmetic induction on n. Indeed, for n = 0,
allPos(l, b) is the consequence of the second rule with no premises, and
for n > 0 it is the consequence of the third rule where we can apply the
inductive hypothesis to the premise.
• If l contains only positive elements, hence b = T, then allPos(l, b) is a
coaxiom, hence it is the consequence of a rule with no premises in Iunionsqγ.
To prove the second condition, we have to show that, for each allPos(l, b) ∈
SallPos, allPos(l, b) is the consequence of a rule with premises in SallPos. This can
be easily shown, indeed:
• If l = Λ, hence b = T, then allPos(Λ, T) is the consequence of the first
rule with no premises.
• If l = x::l′ with x ≤ 0, hence b = F, then allPos(l, F) is the consequence of
the second rule with no premises.
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• If l = x::l′ with x > 0, and b = T, hence allPos(l′, T) ∈ SallPos, then
allPos(l, T) is the consequence of the third rule with premise allPos(l′, T),
and analogously if b = F.
soundness proofs To show soundness, it is convenient to use the alterna-
tive characterization in terms of approximated proof trees given in Section 4.3,
as detailed below. First of all, from Proposition 4.4, D ⊆ ⋂{FnI(β) | n ≥ 0}.
Hence, to prove D ⊆ S , it is enough to show that ⋂{FnI(β) | n ≥ 0} ⊆ S .
Moreover, by Theorem 4.5, for all n ∈N, judgements in FnI(β) are those which
have an approximated proof tree of level n. Hence, to prove set inclusion, we
can show that all judgements which have an approximated proof tree of level n
for each n are in S or equivalently, by contraposition, that judgements which
are not in S , that is, non-valid judgements, fail to have an approximated proof
tree of level n for some n.
We illustrate the technique again on the example of allPos. We have to show
that, for each allPos(l, b) 6∈ SallPos, there exists n ≥ 0 such that allPos(l, b) cannot
be proved by using coaxioms at level greater than n. By cases:
• If l contains a (first) non-positive element, hence
l = x1::. . .::xn::x::l′ with xi > 0 for i ∈ [1..n], x ≤ 0, then, assuming that
coaxioms can only be used at a level greater than n + 1, allPos(l, b) can
only be derived by instantiating n times the third rule, and once the second
rule, hence b cannot be T.
• If l contains only positive elements, then it is immediate to see that there
is no finite proof tree for allPos(l, F).
4.5 taming coaxioms: advanced examples
In this section we will present some more examples of situations where coaxioms
can help to define judgements on non well-founded structures. These more
complex examples will serve as evidence for explaining how to use coaxioms
and which kind of problems they can cope with.
4.5.1 Mutual recursion
Circular definitions involving inductive and coinductive judgements have no
semantics in standard inference systems, because all judgements have to be
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interpreted either inductively, or coinductively. The same problem arises in
the context of coinductive logic programming (Simon et al., 2007), where a
logic program has a well-defined semantics only if inductive and coinductive
predicates can be stratified: each stratum defines only inductive or coinductive
predicates (possibly defined in a mutually recursive way), and cannot depend on
predicates defined in upper strata. Hence, it is possible to define the semantics
of a logic program only if there are no mutually recursive definitions involving
both inductive and coinductive predicates.
We have already seen that an inductive inference system corresponds to an
inference system with coaxioms where there are no coaxioms, while a coinduc-
tive one corresponds to the case where coaxioms consist of all judgements in U ;
however, between these two extremes, coaxioms offer many other possibilities
thus allowing a finer control on the semantics of the defined judgements.
There exist cases where two or more related judgements need to be defined
recursively, but for some of them the correct interpretation is inductive, while
for others is coinductive (Ancona, 2013; Simon et al., 2006, 2007). In such cases,
coaxioms may be employed to provide the correct definition in terms of a single
inference system with no stratification, although special care is required to
get from the inference system the intended meaning of judgements. In order
to see this, let us consider the judgement path0(t), where t is an infinite tree2
over {0, 1}, which holds iff there exists a path starting from the root of t and
containing just 0s. Trees are represented as infinite terms of shape tree(n, l),
where n ∈ {0, 1} is the root of the tree, and l is the infinite list of its direct
subtrees. For instance, if t1 and t2 are the trees defined by the syntactic equations
t1 = tree(0, l1) l1 = t2::t1::l1 t2 = tree(0, l2) l2 = tree(1, l1)::l2
then we expect path0(t1) to hold, but not path0(t2).
To define path0, we introduce an auxiliary judgement is in0(l) testing whether
an infinite list l of trees contains a tree t such that path0(t) holds. Intuitively, we
expect path0 and is in0 to be interpreted coinductively and inductively, respec-
tively; this reflects the fact that path0 checks a property universally quantified
over an infinite sequence (a safety property in the terminology of concurrent
systems): all the elements of the path must be equal to 0; on the contrary, is in0
checks a property existentially quantified over an infinite sequence (a liveness
property in the terminology of concurrent systems): the list must contain a tree
t with a specific property (that is, path0(t) must hold). Driven by this intuition,
one could be tempted to define the following inference system with coaxioms
2 For the purpose of this example, we only consider trees with infinite depth and branching.
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for all judgements of shape path0(t), and no coaxioms for judgements of shape
is in0(l):
is in0(l)
path0(tree(0, l))
•
path0(t)
path0(t)
is in0(t::l)
is in0(l)
is in0(t::l)
Unfortunately, because of the mutual recursion between is in0 and path0, the
inference system above does not capture the intended behaviour: is in0(l) is
derivable for every infinite list of trees l, even when l does not contain a tree t
with an infinite path starting from its root and containing just 0s.
To overcome this problem, we can break the mutual dependency between
judgements, replacing the judgement is in0 with the more general one is in,
such that is in(t, l) holds iff the infinite list l contains the tree t. Consequently,
we can define the following inference system with coaxioms:
is in(t, l) path0(t)
path0(tree(0, l))
•
path0(t) is in(t, t::l)
is in(t, l)
is in(t, t′::l)
Now the semantics of the system corresponds to the intended one, and we
do not need to stratify the definitions into two separate inference systems.
Following the characterization in terms of proof trees and the proof techniques
provided in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, we can sketch a proof of correctness.
Let S be the set where elements have either shape path0(t), where t represents
a tree with an infinite path of just 0s starting from its root, or is in(t, l), where l
represents an infinite list containing the tree t; then a judgement belongs to S
iff it can be derived in the inference system with coaxioms defined above.
completeness: We first show that the set S is a post-fixed point, that is, it
is consistent w.r.t. the inference rules, coaxioms excluded. Indeed, if t has an
infinite path of 0s, then it has necessarily shape tree(0, l), where l must contain
a tree t′ with an infinite path of 0s. Hence, the inference rule for path0 can
be applied with premises is in(t′, l) ∈ S , and path0(t′) ∈ S . If an infinite list
contains a tree t, then it has necessarily shape t′::l where, either t = t′, and
hence the axiom for is in can be applied, or t 6= t′ and t is contained in l, and
hence the inference rule for is in can be applied with premise is in(t, l) ∈ S .
We then show that S is bounded by the closure of the coaxioms. For the ele-
ments of shape path0(t) it suffices to directly apply the corresponding coaxiom;
for the elements of shape is in(t, l) we can show that there exists a finite proof
tree built possibly also with the coaxioms by induction on the first position
(where the head of the list corresponds to 0) in the list where t occurs. If the
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position is 0 (base case), then l = t::l′, and the axiom can be applied; if the
position is n > 0 (inductive step), then l = t′::l′ and t occurs in l′ at position
n − 1, therefore, by inductive hypothesis, there exists a finite proof tree for
is in(t, l′), therefore we can build a finite proof tree for is in(t, l) by applying
the inference rule for is in.
soundness: We first observe that the only finite proof trees that can be
derived for is in(t, l) are obtained by application of the axiom for is in, hence
is in(t, l) holds iff there exists a finite proof tree for is in(t, l) built with the
inference rules for is in. Then, we can prove that, if is in(t, l) holds, then t is
contained in l by induction on the inference rules for is in. For the axiom (base
case) the claim trivially holds, while for the other inference rule we have that if
t belongs to l, then trivially t belongs to t′::l.
For the elements of shape path0(t) we first observe that by the coaxioms they
all trivially belong to the closure of the coaxioms. Then, any proof tree for
path0(t) must be infinite, because there are no axioms but only one inference
rule for path0 where path0 is referred in the premises; furthermore, such a rule
is applicable only if the root of the tree is 0. We have already proved that if
is in(t, l) is derivable, then t belongs to l, therefore we can conclude that if
path0(t) is derivable, then t contains an infinite path starting from its root, and
containing just 0s.
We conclude this example by providing an alternative (even though a bit
redundant) inference system, that allows us to recover judgements of shape
is in0, without breaking the correctness of the definition. We can introduce the
auxiliary predicate is in0 defined in terms of is in and path0, and still get the
intended semantics, since we have removed the dangerous cyclic rule for is in0:
is in0(l)
path0(tree(0, l))
•
path0(t)
is in(t, l) path0(t)
is in0(l) is in(t, t::l)
is in(t, l)
is in(t, t′::l)
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4.5.2 A numerical example
It is well-known that real numbers in the closed interval [0, 1] can be represented
by infinite sequences (di)i∈N+ of decimal3 digits, where N+ denotes the set
of all positive natural numbers. Indeed, (di)i∈N+ represents the real number
which is the limit of the series ∑∞i=1 10
−idi in the standard complete metric
space of real numbers (such a limit always exists by completeness, because
the associated sequence of partial sums is always a Cauchy sequence). Such
a representation is not unique for all rational numbers in [0, 1] (except for the
bounds 0 and 1) that can be represented by a finite sequence of digits followed
by an infinite sequence of 0s; for instance, 0.42 can be represented either by the
sequence 420¯, or by the sequence 419¯, where d¯ denotes the infinite sequence
containing just the digit d.
For brevity, for r = (di)i∈N+ , JrK denotes ∑∞i=1 10−idi (that is, the real number
represented by r). We want to define the judgement add(r1, r2, r, c) which holds
iff Jr1K+ Jr2K = JrK+ c with c an integer number; that is, add(r1, r2, r, c) holds
iff the addition of the two real numbers represented by the sequences r1 and
r2 yields the real number represented by the sequence r with carry c. We will
soon discover that, to get a complete definition for add, c is required to range
over a proper superset of the set {0, 1}, differently from what one could initially
expect.
We can define the judgement add with the following inference system with
coaxioms, where ÷ and mod denote the integer division, and the remainder
operator, respectively.
add(r1, r2, r, c)
add(d1::r1, d2::r2, (s mod 10)::r, s÷ 10) s = d1 + d2 + c
•
add(r1, r2, r, c)
A real number in [0, 1] is represented by an infinite list of decimal digits,
which, therefore, can always be decomposed as d::r, where d is the first digit
(corresponding to the exponent −1), and r is the rest of the list of digits. Here,
r1, r2, and r range over the set of infinite lists of decimal digits, while the
carry must range over {−1, 0, 1, 2} to support a complete definition. As clearly
emerges from the proof of completeness provided below, besides the obvious
values 0 and 1, the values −1 and 2 have to be considered for the carry to ensure
a complete definition of add because both add(0¯, 0¯, 9¯,−1) and add(9¯, 9¯, 0¯, 2) hold,
and, hence, should be derivable; these two judgements allow the derivation of
3 Of course the example can be generalized to any base B ≥ 2.
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an infinite number of other valid judgements, as, for instance, add(10¯, 10¯, 19¯, 0)
and add(19¯, 19¯, 40¯, 0), respectively.
Also in this case we can sketch a proof of correctness: for all infinite sequences
of decimal digits r1, r2 and r, and all c ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}, add(r1, r2, r, c) is derivable
iff Jr1K+ Jr2K = JrK+ c.
completeness : By the coaxioms we trivially have that each element of shape
add(r1, r2, r, c) such that Jr1K+ Jr2K = JrK+ c with c ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2} belongs to
the closure of the coaxioms.
To show that the unique inference rule of the system is consistent with the
set of all valid judgements, let us assume that
q
r′1
y
+
q
r′2
y
= Jr′K + c′ with
r′1 = d1::r1, r
′
2 = d2::r2, r
′ = d::r and c′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}. Let us set s = 10c′ + d,
and c = s− d1 − d2, then s mod 10 = d and s÷ 10 = c′, and we get the desired
conclusion of the inference rule, and the side condition holds; it remains to
show that Jr1K+ Jr2K = JrK+ c with c ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}.
We first observe that by the properties of limits w.r.t. the usual arithmetic
operations, and by definition of J−K, for all infinite sequence r of decimal
digits, if r = d::r′, then JrK = 10−1(d + Jr′K); then, from the hypotheses we
get the equality d1 + Jr1K+ d2 + Jr2K = d + JrK+ 10c′, hence d1 + Jr1K+ d2 +Jr2K = JrK + s, and, therefore, Jr1K + Jr2K = JrK + c; finally, c is an integer
because it is an algebraic sum of integers, and, since c = Jr1K+ Jr2K− JrK, and
0 ≤ Jr1K , Jr2K , JrK ≤ 1, we get c ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}.
soundness : Let r′1 = d1::r1, r
′
2 = d2::r2, and r
′ = d::r be infinite sequences of
decimal digits, and c′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}; we note that the judgement add(r′1, r′2, r′, c′)
can only be derived from the unique inference rule where the premise is the
judgement add(r1, r2, r, c) with c equal to 10c′+ d− d1− d2 and must range over
{−1, 0, 1, 2}.
To prove soundness we show that if
q
r′1
y
+
q
r′2
y 6= Jr′K+ c′, then the judge-
ment add(r′1, r
′
2, r
′, c′) cannot be derived in the inference system. Let us set δ′ =
| Jr′K+ c′− qr′1y− qr′2y |; obviously, under the hypothesis qr′1y+ qr′2y 6= Jr′K+ c′,
we get δ′ > 0. In particular, the following fact holds: if δ′ ≥ 4 · 10−1, then
10c′ + d− d1 − d2 6∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}. Indeed, by the identity JrK = 10−1(d + Jr′K)
already used for the proof of completeness, we have that δ′ = 10−1δ with δ =
| JrK+ c− Jr1K− Jr2K |, with c = 10c′ + d− d1− d2; 10−1(JrK+ c− Jr1K− Jr2K) ≥
4 · 10−1 implies c ≥ 3 (Jr1K , Jr2K , JrK ∈ [0, 1]), and, hence, c = 10c′+ d− d1− d2 6∈
{−1, 0, 1, 2}. On the other hand, 10−1(JrK+ c− Jr1K− Jr2K) ≤ −4 · 10−1 implies
c ≤ −2, hence c = 10c′ + d− d1 − d2 6∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}.
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By virtue of this fact, and thanks to the hypotheses, we can prove by arithmetic
induction over n that for all n ≥ 1, if δ′ ≥ 4 · 10−n, then there exist only finite
proof trees for add(r′1, r
′
2, r
′, c′) where the coaxioms are applied at most at depth
n− 1. The base case is directly derived from the previously proven fact. Indeed,
for n = 1, we can only derive add(r′1, r
′
2, r
′, c′) by directly applying the coaxiom.
For the inductive step we observe that all derivation of depth greater than 1
are built applying the inference rule as first step. If such rule is applicable
for deriving the conclusion add(r′1, r
′
2, r
′, c′), then we can apply the inductive
hypothesis for the premise add(r1, r2, r, c) since we have already shown that
δ′ = 10−1δ, therefore δ ≥ 4 · 10−(n−1).
We can now conclude by observing that if
q
r′1
y
+
q
r′2
y 6= Jr′K+ c′, then there
exists n such that δ′ ≥ 4 · 10−n, therefore, by the previous result, we deduce that
it is not possible to build a finite tree for add(r′1, r
′
2, r
′, c′) where the coaxioms
are applied at arbitrary depth k (in particular, k is bounded by n− 1); therefore
add(r′1, r
′
2, r
′, c′) cannot be derived in the inference system.
From the proof of soundness we can also deduce that if we let c range
over Z, then the inference system becomes unsound; for instance, it would be
possible to build the following infinite proof for add(0¯, 0¯, 0¯, 1) where all nodes
clearly belong to the closure of the coaxioms, and, hence, add(0¯, 0¯, 0¯, 1) would
be derivable, but J0¯K+ J0¯K 6= J0¯K+ 1:
...
add(0¯, 0¯, 0¯, 101)
add(0¯, 0¯, 0¯, 100)
4.5.3 Distances and shortest paths on weighted graphs
In Section 3.1 we have presented a definition for the predicate dist(v, u, δ)
stating that the distance between node v and u in a graph is δ. In that case
the standard coinductive interpretation was enough to capture the intended
semantics. Here we consider a more complex problem: to compute distances
between nodes in a weighted graph.
Let us introduce the notion of weights for graphs. In a graph (V, adj) the
set of edges is the set E ⊆ V×V defined by E = {(v, u) ∈ V×V | u ∈ adj(v)}.
We will often write vu for an edge (v, u) ∈ E. A weight function is a function
w : E→N. Here we consider natural numbers as codomain, however we could
have considered any other set of non-negative numbers. Hence, a weighted
graph is a graph (V, adj) together with a weight function w.
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Figure 3: Proof trees for dist(c, e, 1+ δ1) and dist(a, d, δ2)
dist(e, e, 0)
...
dist(b, e, δ1)
dist(a, e, δ1)
δ1 ≤ 5
dist(c, e, 1+ δ1)
dist(e, d, ∞)
...
dist(b, e, δ2)
dist(a, d, δ2)
In a weighted graph G, the weight of a path α is the sum of the weights of
the edges (counting repetitions) determined by α, we denote this by w(α). Note
that in general the weight of a path α is different from its length, defined as the
number of edges (counting repetitions) determined by the path and denoted by
‖α‖. The distance between nodes v and u is defined as the minimum weight
of a path connecting v to u, it is infinite if no such path exists. Below we show
the inference system with coaxioms defining the judgement dist(v, u, δ) on a
weighted graph, where δ ∈N∪ {∞}.
dist(v, v, 0) dist(v, u, ∞)
v 6= u
adj(v) = ∅
•
dist(v, u, ∞)
dist(v1, u, δ1) . . . dist(vk, u, δk)
dist(v, u, δ)
v 6= u
adj(v) = {v1, . . . , vk} 6= ∅
δ = min{w(vv1) + δ1, . . . , w(vvk) + δk}
In order to show that we cannot simply consider the coinductive interpretation
of the above inference system, hence we need coaxioms, let us consider a
weighted version of the simple graph shown in Section 3.1.
e b
d a c
0
2
0
5
1
If we interpret the inference system coinductively we can derive judgements
like dist(c, e, δ) for any δ ∈ [1..5] or dist(a, d, δ) for any δ ∈N∪ {∞}, as shown
in Figure 3. The issue here is the cycle that, having total weight equal to 0,
allows us to build cyclic proofs without increasing the value of δ. Therefore the
coaxiom is needed to filter out such proofs. Indeed, it is easy to see that it is not
possible to build a finite proof tree for judgements proved in Figure 3 starting
from the coaxiom.
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Now we will sketch a proof of correctness. First of all we prove two useful
facts.
(?) For all proof trees t for a judgement dist(v, u, δ), there exists a
path α from v to u with ‖α‖ = n iff there exists a node in t at level n
labelled by dist(u, u, 0).
Let t be a proof tree for dist(v, u, δ). We prove separately the two implications.
⇒ Let α be a path from v to u. We proceed by induction on the length of α.
If ‖α‖ = 0 (base case), then v = u, hence dist(v, u, δ) has been derived
by applying the first axiom, and this implies δ = 0. Therefore the root
of t (at level 0) is labelled by dist(u, u, 0). If ‖α‖ = n + 1 (inductive step),
then α = vβ where β is a path from a node v′ to u of length n. Therefore
dist(v, u, δ) has been derived by applying the inference rule, hence there is
a direct subtree of t rooted in dist(v′, u, δ′), where, by inductive hypothesis,
dist(u, u, 0) occurs at level n. Thus in t that judgement occurs at level
n + 1 as needed.
⇐ We proceed by induction on the level n. If dist(u, u, 0) occurs at level 0 (base
case), then it is the root of t, hence v = u and the searched path is the
singleton path u. If it occurs at level n + 1 (inductive step), then the depth
of t is greater than 0, hence dist(v, u, δ) has been derived by applying the
inference rule. Therefore dist(u, u, 0) belongs to a direct subtree t′ of t
rooted in dist(v′, u, δ′) and it occurs in t′ at level n. Thus by inductive
hypothesis there is a path β from v′ to u of length n, hence the path vβ of
length n + 1 connects v to u.
(??) For all proof tree t, t is rooted in dist(v, u, ∞) iff all nodes in t
are of shape dist(v′, u, ∞).
Consider a proof tree t. The implication⇐ is trivial. Let us prove the other one.
Consider a node in t, we proceed by induction on the level of such node. If the
level is 0 (base case), then the thesis follows immediately by hypothesis. If the
level is n + 1 (inductive step), then the selected node is the child of a node at
level n, that, by inductive hypothesis, is of shape dist(v′, u, ∞). Therefore the
inference rule has been applied, and, since the conclusion is dist(v′, u, ∞), all
premises, including the selected node, must be of shape dist(v′′, u, ∞), because
we take the minimum.
We can formulate the correctness statement as follows: dist(v, u, δ) is deriv-
able iff δ is the minimum of w(α) for all paths α from v to u.
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completeness: Let us consider a judgement dist(v, u, δ) where δ is the
minimum of w(α) for α a path from v to u. If δ = 0 or δ = ∞ or adj(v) = ∅,
then dist(v, u, δ) is the consequence of an axiom. Otherwise, note that α = vβ
where β is a path from a node v′ ∈ adj(v) to u, hence w(α) = w(vv′) + w(β).
Furthermore, if there were another path β′ from a node v′ to u with w(β′) <
w(β), then the path vβ′ would be such that w(vβ′) < w(α) = δ, that is absurd,
hence dist(v′, u, w(β)) is a valid judgement. Moreover, note that for any other
vi ∈ adj(v), with dist(vi, u, δi) a valid judgement, we have δ ≤ w(vvi) + δi, since,
otherwise, we could build a path from v to u with weight less than δ, that
is absurd. Therefore dist(v, u, δ) is the consequence of the inference rule and
its premises are valid judgements, and this shows that the specification is a
consistent set.
In order to show the boundedness condition, we have to build a finite proof
tree for dist(v, u, δ) (chosen as before) using coaxioms as axioms. If δ = 0
or δ = ∞ we simply apply either the axiom or the coaxiom, and the same
holds when adj(v) = ∅. Otherwise, we know that there is a path α from v to
u with w(α) = δ. Let us assume α = v0 · · · vn with v = v0 and u = vn, hence
vi+1 ∈ adj(vi) for all i ∈ [0..n− 1]. At each level i we apply the inference rule
with consequence dist(vi, u, δi) and premises dist(v′, u, ∞), for all v′ ∈ adj(vi)
with v′ 6= vi+1, and dist(vi+1, u, δi+1). The only exception is level n where,
instead of the inference rule, since vn = u, we apply the axiom dist(u, u, 0). In
this way we have that for all i, δi = w(vi · · · vn), hence δ0 = w(α) = δ as needed.
soundness: Here we have to show that each derivable judgement is valid.
For judgements of shape dist(v, u, ∞) the thesis follows immediately from (?)
and (??). Hence, let us assume δ ∈N.
We assume that δ is not the minimum weight of a path α from v to u, and we
prove that the judgement dist(v, u, δ) cannot be derived with an approximated
proof tree of level n for some n.
We first note that if dist(v, u, δ) has an approximated proof tree of depth4
n, then δ is the minimum weight of a path α from v to u with ‖α‖ ≤ n. We
proceed by induction on n. If n = 0 (base case), then v = u and δ = 0, since the
only applicable rule is the first axiom, and this is enough since the only path of
length 0 is the trivial one, that has weight 0.
If the depth is n + 1 (inductive step), then, assuming adj(v) = {v1, . . . , vk},
dist(vi, u, δi) has an approximated proof tree of depth n. Therefore, by inductive
4 Here we consider just the depth of the proof tree, not its level as in Definition 4.5.
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hypothesis, we get that δi is the minimum weight of a path α from vi to u with
‖α‖ ≤ n. Hence δ is the minimum of the w(vvi) + δi.
Let now α be a path from v to u with ‖α‖ ≤ n + 1, hence α = vβ where β is a
path from vi to u for some i with ‖β‖ ≤ n. Therefore we have δ ≤ w(vvi) + δi ≤
w(vvi) + w(β) = w(α), by inductive hypothesis.
So, if dist(v, u, δ) is not valid, then there is a path α from v to u such that
w(α) < δ. Assuming that α has length equal to n, we have just shown that
dist(v, u, δ) cannot have an approximated proof tree of depth greater than n.
Now an approximated proof tree of level n either does not use coaxioms or
uses coaxioms and has depth greater than n. From what we have just proved,
the latter case is not possible. In the former case, by (?), since α is a path in
the graph, there is a node in the proof tree at level n labelled by dist(u, u, 0),
and, as the proof tree has at least depth equal to n, that is absurd. Therefore
dist(v, u, δ) cannot have an approximated proof tree of level n.
The notion of distance is tightly related to paths in a graph G. Actually, from
the above proofs, it is easy to see that a proof tree for a judgement dist(v, u, δ)
explores all possible paths from v to u in the graph in order to compute the
distance. Therefore, in some sense, it also finds the shortest path from v to u.
Hence, with a slight variation of the inference system for the distance, we can
get an inference system for the judgement spath(v, u, α, δ) stating that α is the
shortest path from v to u with weight δ. We add to paths the special one ⊥ that
represents the absence of paths between two nodes, with the assumption that
v⊥ = ⊥.
spath(v, v, v, 0) spath(v, u, ⊥, ∞)
v 6= u
adj(v) = ∅
•
dist(v, u, ⊥)∞
spath(v1, u, α1, δ1) . . . spath(vk, u, αk, δk)
spath(v, u, vαi, w(vvi) + δi)
v 6=u
adj(v)={v1,...,vk}6=∅
i=arg min{w(vv1)+δ1,...,w(vvk)+δk}
4.5.4 Big-step operational semantics with divergence
It is well-known that divergence cannot be captured by the big-step operational
semantics of a programming language when semantic rules are interpreted
inductively (that is, in the standard way) (Ancona, 2012, 2014; Leroy and Grall,
2009). When rules are interpreted coinductively some partial result can be
obtained under suitable hypotheses, but a practical way to capture divergence
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Syntax of terms and values
e ::= v | x | e e v ::= λx.e v∞ ::= v | ∞
Semantic rules
(coax)
•
e⇒ ∞ (val) v⇒ v (app)
e1 ⇒ λx.e e2 ⇒ v e[x ← v]⇒ v∞
e1 e2 ⇒ v∞
(l-inf)
e1 ⇒ ∞
e1 e2 ⇒ ∞ (r-inf)
e1 ⇒ v e2 ⇒ ∞
e1 e2 ⇒ ∞
Figure 4: Call-by-value big-step semantics of λ-calculus with divergence
with a big-step operational semantics is to introduce two different forms of
judgement (Cousot and Cousot, 1992; Leroy and Grall, 2009): one corresponds
to the standard big-step evaluation relation, and is defined inductively, while
the other one captures divergence, and is defined coinductively in terms of the
inductive judgement, thus requiring stratification.
With coaxioms a unique judgement can be defined in a more direct and
compact way. We show5 how this is possible for the standard call-by-value
operational semantics of the λ-calculus in big-step style. Figure 4 defines syntax,
values, and semantic rules. The meta-variable v ranges over standard values,
that is, lambda abstractions, while v∞ includes also divergence, represented
by ∞. The evaluation judgement has the general shape e⇒ v∞, meaning that
either e evaluates to a value v (when v∞ 6= ∞) or diverges (when v∞ = ∞).
For what concerns the semantic rules, only a coaxiom is needed, stating that
every expression may diverge. This ensures that ∞ can be the only allowed
outcome for the evaluation of an expression which diverges; this can only
happen when the corresponding derivation tree is infinite. Rule (val) is standard.
Rule (app) deals with the evaluation of application when both expressions e1
and e2 do not diverge; the meta-variable v is required for the judgement e2 ⇒ v
to guarantee convergence of e2, while v∞ is used for the result of the whole
application, since the evaluation of the body of the lambda abstraction could
diverge. As usual, e[x ← v] denotes capture-avoiding substitution modulo
α-renaming. Rules (l-inf) and (r-inf) cover the cases when either e1 or e2 diverges
when trying to evaluate application, assuming that a left-to-right evaluation
strategy has been imposed.
5 This example was inspired by Bart Jacobs.
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We show that the only judgement derivable for e∆ = (λx.x x)λx.x x is
e∆ ⇒ ∞. To this aim, we first disregard the coaxiom and exhibit an infinite
derivation tree for the judgement e∆ ⇒ v∞, derivable for all v∞:
(app)
(val)
λx.x x ⇒ λx.x x (val) λx.x x ⇒ λx.x x (app)
...
(x x)[x ← λx.x x]⇒ v∞
(x x)[x ← λx.x x] = e∆ ⇒ v∞
In this particular case the derivation tree is also regular, but of course there
are examples of divergent computations whose derivation tree is not regular.
The vertical dots indicate that the derivation continues with the same repeated
pattern. The derivation corresponds to the coinductive interpretation of the
standard big-step semantics rules (Ancona, 2012; Leroy and Grall, 2009), which
may exhibit non-deterministic behaviour as happens for this example; however,
here the coaxiom plays a crucial role by filtering out all undesired values, and,
thus, leaving only the value ∞ representing divergence; indeed, by employing
also the coaxiom, finite derivation trees can be built for e∆ ⇒ v∞ only when
v∞ = ∞. By Theorem 4.8 we can get an infinite sequence of approximating
sequence of arbitrarily increasing level:
(coax)
e∆ ⇒ ∞
(app)
(val)
λx.x x ⇒ λx.x x (val) λx.x x ⇒ λx.x x (coax) (x x)[x ← λx.x x]⇒ ∞
(x x)[x ← λx.x x] = e∆ ⇒ ∞
...
As a consequence, in the inference system with the coaxiom a valid infinite
derivation tree can be built for e∆ ⇒ v∞ only when v∞ = ∞.

5
R E L AT E D W O R K
Inference systems (Aczel, 1977) are widely adopted to formally define oper-
ational semantics, language translations, type systems, subtyping relations,
deduction calculi, and many other relevant judgements. Although inference
systems have been introduced for dealing with inductive definitions, in the last
two decades several authors have focused on their coinductive interpretation.
Cousot and Cousot (1992) define divergence of programs by coinductive
interpretation of an inference system that extends the big-step operational
semantics. The same approach is followed by other authors (Hughes and
Moran, 1995; Leroy and Grall, 2009; Schmidt, 1998). Leroy and Grall (2009)
analyse two kinds of coinductive big-step operational semantics for the call-
by-value λ-calculus, and study their relationships with the small-step and
denotational semantics, and their suitability for compiler correctness proofs.
Coinductive big-step semantics is used as well to reason on cyclic objects stored
in memory (Leroy and Rouaix, 1998; Milner and Tofte, 1991), and to prove type
soundness in Java-like languages (Ancona, 2012, 2014). Coinductive inference
systems are also considered in the context of type analysis and subtyping for
object-oriented languages (Ancona and Corradi, 2014; Ancona and Lagorio,
2009).
More recently several approaches have been proposed to extend existing
programming languages to support coinductive data types and corecursion.
Therefore, these proposals are more focused on operational aspects, and their
corresponding implementation issues; we can find contributions in all most
popular paradigms: logic (Simon et al., 2006, 2007), object-oriented (Ancona
and Zucca, 2012, 2013), and functional (Jeannin et al., 2013, 2017). Also in type
theory (Abel and Pientka, 2013; Abel et al., 2013; Coquand, 1993; Møgelberg,
2014) and category theory (Ada´mek et al., 2006a; Capretta et al., 2006, 2009) we
can find some research effort in this direction with a more abstract perspective.
The following discussion of related work will be divided into these two areas:
language support for programming with coinductive data types and abstract
models for dealing with such data types.
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5.1 programming with coinductive data types
logic paradigm A logic program is a set of Horn clauses A← B1, . . . , Bn,
specifying that the atom A (the head) is valid if atoms B1, . . . , Bn (the body) are
valid. The execution of a program consists in the resolution of a goal (a set of
atoms) against the program: the interpreter tries to build a valid derivation of
the atoms in the goal using the clauses in the program.
Objects manipulated by a logic program are ground1 terms and ground atoms
built on them, hence the declarative semantics of a logic program is a set of such
atoms. Actually, a logic program is a particular inference system on a universe
consisting of ground atoms, hence we can reuse the model-theoretic semantics
of inference systems to define the declarative semantics of a logic program.
In standard logic programming (LP), terms are finite, hence atoms are finite
too, thus the universe is the Herbrand base, that is, the set of all finite ground
atoms. Since everything is finite, the most reasonable choice for the semantics
of a logic program is its inductive interpretation, that is, the least fixed point of
the inference operator induced by the logic program.
Therefore, only finite derivations are valid, hence a sound resolution proce-
dure has to try to build a finite derivation for all atoms in the goal. More
precisely, the standard resolution of LP, called SLD resolution, is performed in
three steps:
1. First, an atom A from the current goal is selected.
2. Then, the interpreter looks for a clause A′ ← B1, . . . , Bn in the program
whose head unifies with the selected atom (we need unification since both
A and A′ may contain free variables).
3. Finally, all atoms in the body B1, . . . , Bn are added to the goal and the
substitution deriving from the unification is applied to the goal.
These steps are iterated until we get an empty goal.
In coinductive logic programming (coLP), introduced by Simon et al. (2007), also
infinite terms are considered, hence infinite atoms. Therefore, coLP programs
are interpreted in a different universe: the complete Herbrand base, that consists
of all finite and infinite ground atoms. This is the reason why the declarative
semantics of a coLP program is its coinductive interpretation, that is, the greatest
fixed point of the induced inference operator. In this way also definitions of
coinductive predicates are supported.
1 That is, with no free variables.
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From an operational perspective, first of all we have to represent infinite
terms. More precisely, only regular terms are considered, that is, terms with a
finite number of subterms, that can be naturally represented through unification
as a finite set of syntactic equations (Ada´mek et al., 2006b). Then, a sound
resolution procedure (Ancona and Dovier, 2015; Simon et al., 2006, 2007) can be
defined, based on cycle detection (coresolution). That is, during the resolution
the interpreter keeps track of all encountered atoms and, when it selects from
the current goal an atom that has already been encountered, it simply accepts
it. In this way also cyclic derivations can be built enabling coinductive logic
programming.
In coLP only standard coinduction is supported. In (Ancona, 2013; Man-
tadelis et al., 2014) more flexible operational models are provided. In particular,
the notion of finally clause, introduce by Ancona (2013), allows the program-
mer to specify a fact that should be resolved when a cycle is detected, instead
of simply accepting the atom. In this way, predicates that are neither purely
inductive nor purely coinductive can be defined and used in a logic program.
The notion of finally clause has inspired coaxioms as described in this thesis.
However, despite the existing strong correlation with coaxioms, the semantics
of finally clauses does not always coincide with a fixed point of the inference
operator induced by the program. This is a relevant difference with coaxioms,
that, instead, always generate a fixed point.
functional paradigm A functional program consists in a set of function
definitions together with an expression to be evaluated. In existing functional
languages we can find two main evaluation strategies: eager evaluation (call-by-
value) and lazy evaluation (call-by-need). In the former approach, all arguments
of a function call are immediately evaluated and their value, if present, is
returned; instead, the latter approach delays the evaluation of arguments in a
function call until their value is needed for the computation.
Functional languages based on lazy evaluation, such as Haskell, naturally
support infinite data types and the definition of corecursive functions on them,
both by means of standard function definition. For instance, the stream of
all natural numbers can be defined by the function f (n) = n:: f (n + 1), hence
f (0) represents the stream of all natural numbers. This definition makes sense
because the recursive call f (n + 1) is evaluated only when we access the tail of
the stream, hence, without causing non termination.
However, in this way, infinite objects are never fully available; in other words,
they are “potential” objects that can be deconstructed infinitely many times, but
functions that require the whole object to be computed cannot be defined. For
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instance, if we want to compute the maximal element of an infinite list, we need
to inspect the whole list, and this cannot be done lazily.
In the ML family, instead, which adopts eager evaluation, a different approach
has been considered: as in the logic paradigm, infinite terms are restricted to
regular ones, and a different semantics is defined for corecursive functions. This
idea is implemented in CoCaml (Jeannin et al., 2017).
CoCaml, as already OCaml, allows the programmer to declare regular objects
through the let-rec construct. A corecursive call to a function is performed
by building a system of equations that will be solved by an equation solver
specified in the function definition. The system of equations is constructed
associating with each function call a variable and partially evaluating the body
of the function, by replacing each corecursive call with the associated variable.
Solvers can be either pre-defined or directly written by the programmer in
order to enhance flexibility. Among proposed pre-defined solvers in (Jeannin
et al., 2017), the iterator solver seems to have an expressive power very similar to
finally clauses.
From a more abstract point of view, corecursive functions are solutions to
an appropriate hylo diagram, whose existence is guaranteed by the fact that
the codomain with the equation solver should form an Elgot algebra (Ada´mek
et al., 2006a), see next section. However, in (Jeannin et al., 2013, 2017) there is no
formal proof of this. The intuition suggests that choosing a solver corresponds
to choose a specific partial order on the codomain of the function, in such a way
that the desired function is a fixed point in the corresponding CPO.
However, he spirit of our work is very different from that of CoCaml, since
we do not aim to extend a practical language with corecursion, but, rather, to
provide a very general framework which smoothly extends the well-known
notion of inference system, and that could be used in many useful contexts,
as shown in Section 4.5. The foundation of CoCaml is based on the theory
of recursion in the framework of category theory and in particular using
coalgebras. Our approach, instead, relies on the standard complete lattice of
subsets, with set inclusion as partial order. In this way, a single and simple
model, based on classical results, works uniformly for any possible recursive
definition expressed in terms of an inference system wit coaxioms.
object-oriented paradigm In the object-oriented paradigm cyclic objects
are usually managed relying on imperative features, thus the language does not
provide any native support for computing with such objects. The programmer
has to implement ad-hoc machinery to deal with cyclic objects in an appropriate
way, and this is often involved and error-prone.
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In order to overcome these difficulties, Ancona and Zucca (2012, 2013) have
proposed an extension of Featherweight Java (FJ) (Igarashi et al., 1999): core-
cursive Featherweight Java (coFJ). This is a purely functional core calculus for
Java-like languages supporting cyclic objects and corecursive methods.
Cyclic objects are represented by syntactic equations. They cannot be directly
written by the programmer, but only built during the execution by corecursive
methods. Analogously to the mechanism we have described for coresolution,
each corecursive call is evaluated in an environment associating to already
encountered calls a unique label. If the call is in the environment, then the
associated label is returned as result, otherwise a fresh label is associated to the
current call, and the method body is evaluated in the extended environment;
finally, an equation for this new label is returned as result.
To make the mechanism more flexible, like in the logic paradigm, the authors
introduce a with clause associated either to the expression or to the method
definition, that is, an expression that will be evaluated when a cycle is detected
instead of simply returning the label, and this provides support for methods
that are neither purely recursive nor purely corecursive. Again like in the logic
paradigm, this feature has inspired coaxioms and is strongly related to them,
however the semantics of with clauses may not always correspond to a fixed
point, while coaxioms always generate a fixed point.
5.2 category-theoretic and type-theoretic models
algebras , coalgebras and (co)recursion The category-theoretic so-
lution to interpret (co)inductive definitions is based on the notions of algebras
and coalgebras of an endofunctor F on a given category (Jacobs and Rutten,
1997). An F-algebra is a pair (A, α) where A and α : FA→ A are respectively an
object and an arrow in the base category; dually, an F-coalgebra is a pair (C, γ)
where C and γ : C → FC are respectively an object and an arrow in the base
category.
Here, the endofunctor represents the structure of the definition, for instance
in the example of natural numbers the functor is FX = 1+ X, where 1 is the
terminal object in the base category and + denotes the coproduct; or for streams
of type A the functor is FX = A× X, where A is an object and × denotes the
product.
The object inductively defined by F is the initial F-algebra (µF, in) (Goguen and
Thatcher, 1974), while the coinductively defined object is the final F-coalgebra
(νF, out) (Jacobs, 2016; Rutten, 2000). They are an algebra and a coalgebra
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satisfying the following universal property: for each F-algebra (A, α) (resp.
F-coalgebra (C, γ)) there exists a unique arrow α∗ : µF→ A (resp. γ∗ : C → νF)
such that the following diagram commutes:
µF A
FµF FA
α∗
in
Fα∗
α
C νF
FC FνF
γ
γ∗
out
Fγ∗
This universal property is a form of (co)recursion principle, that is, it allows
us to assign a meaning to (co)recursive definitions of certain types of functions.
Furthermore, thanks to the Lambek’s lemma (Lambek, 1968), in and out are
isos, thus we can equivalently express the commutativity of the diagrams as
α∗ = in−1 · Fα∗ · α and γ∗ = γ · Fγ∗ · out−1, where · denotes arrow composition.
So these diagrams turn out to be particular instances of a more general recursion
scheme described in the following diagram, sometimes called hylo diagram:
C A
FC FA
γ
f
F f
α
This diagram describes a divide-et-impera approach, that is, we first decompose
the input by the F-coalgebra γ, then we perform recursive calls, and finally we
aggregate results through an F-algebra α.
Unfortunately, in the general case, that is, when (A, α) and (C, γ) are an
arbitrary algebra and coalgebra, respectively, we are not guaranteed that such
an f exists, neither that it is unique. For such reason, algebras and coalgebras
that ensure unique solutions have been studied under the name of recursive
coalgebras (Capretta et al., 2006) and corecursive algebras (Capretta et al., 2009),
respectively.
A slightly different perspective is adopted by Ada´mek et al. (2006a): rather
than requiring the existence of unique solutions to recursion schemes, they
focus on canonical solutions. They represent a recursive definition as a system
of equations, that, in categorical terms, is an arrow X → FX + A where X is an
object representing variables, A is an F-algebra representing parameters and F
is a structure functor. In other words, a system of equations is an H-coalgebra,
where H is the functor HX = FX + A. A solution to a system of equations
e : X → HX is an arrow e∗ : X → A that makes the following hylo digram
commute:
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X A
FX + A FA + A
e
e∗
He∗
(α, idA)
In order to study canonical solutions, Ada´mek et al. (2006a) define the notion
of Elgot algebra, that is a triple (A, α, (−)∗) where (A, α) is an F-algebra and
(−)∗ is a function mapping each system of equations to its (canonical) solution.
type theory Type theories are formal theories where primitive concepts
are types and terms. These theories are very versatile: they can be used as
foundational framework for mathematics, to reason about rich type systems
(e.g., polymorphic and dependent type systems), and to implement powerful
proof assistants, such as Coq and Agda.
We consider type theories here since they can serve as a foundational frame-
work for programming languages, and actually can be regarded as special
programming languages. Indeed type theories bring together a logical system
and a (functional) programming language, however the latter is quite differ-
ent from usual languages: here all functions must be total, that is, they must
terminate.
However, non-termination can be encoded relying on infinite objects: a non-
terminating computation is one that builds an infinite result. Therefore, the
system has to guarantee that defined functions either terminate or produce an
infinite result. The second requirement is achieved by ensuring that the function
definition is productive, that is, if we inspect the result finitely many times, then
we always get a result.
Several approaches to ensure productivity have been proposed, with different
representations of infinite objects. First attempts represent objects as non-well-
founded terms over a signature of constructors, and ensure productivity through
syntactic checks, as, e.g., in (Coquand, 1993). Here productivity is guaranteed by
checking that each recursive reference is guarded by at least one constructor. In
this way, we are sure that each recursive call unfolds some constructor, that is,
produces some data.
A strong limitation of this approach is that it is not compositional, since the
composition of guarded recursive functions may give rise to a non-guarded
definition. To recover compositionality, type-based productivity checks have
been proposed, as, for instance, in (Atkey and McBride, 2013; Møgelberg, 2014),
where productivity is achieved by a type system with guarded recursive types,
represented through a type constructor inspired by modal logic.
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In (Abel and Pientka, 2013; Abel et al., 2013) a different approach is consid-
ered. Authors accept duality between finite and infinite objects and make it
even stronger. Indeed, the former are built using constructors, while the latter
are observed using destructors. Formally, finite objects are instances of recursive
variant types (each variant is a constructor), while infinite objects are instances
of recursive record types (each field is a destructor) and their semantics is given
by an initial algebra and by a final coalgebra, respectively. Moreover, functions
over finite objects are defined by pattern matching, while those that produce
infinite objects by copattern matching, that is, by defining the behaviour of the
function under all possible observations. Under this approach, productivity
reduces to termination, indeed a function definition is productive if any finite
number of observations on its result terminates, and termination is ensured by
the type system using sized types.
Despite these categorical and type-theoretic models address analogous prob-
lems as coaxioms, the relationship with them is not clear and it is matter of
further work.
6
C O N C L U S I O N S
Inference systems are a general and versatile framework that is well-known and
widely used. It allows to define several kinds of judgements from operational
semantics to type systems, from deduction calculi to language translations.
They can also serve as theory to reason about recursive definitions, providing a
rigorous semantics in a quite simple way.
We have described two well-known equivalent semantics for inference sys-
tems: one in a model-theoretic style and the other in a proof-theoretic style.
The former defines the interpretation of an inference system as a fixed point
of the inference operator, the latter, instead, as the set of judgements that has
a certain witness of their acceptability. These witnesses are called proof trees
(or derivations) and represent the steps, each one justifiesd by a rule, that we
have to take in order to obtain the desired judgement, starting from some
assumptions if necessary.
In literature we have not found a rigorous enough (for our aims) treatment of
the proof-theoretic semantics, hence we have provided it starting from a very
precise definition of tree (see Section 3.1.1). Thanks to this precise notion of tree
we proved Theorem 3.1, that states the existence of a canonical homomorphism
of graphs, mapping each node of a given graph to a tree rooted in such node.
This result has allowed us to give a new, at the best of our knowledge, proof of
the equivalence between the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic semantics in
the coinductive case.
The core of this thesis, however, is the concept of inference system with
coaxioms (Chapter 4): a generalized notion of inference system, that subsumes
the standard one, supporting flexible definitions of judgements by structural
recursion on non-well-founded data types. Indeed standard inference systems
suffer from a strong rigidity: their interpretation is dichotomous, either induc-
tive (the least one) or coinductive (the greatest one), but what can we do if
we need something in the middle? One may ask if this is a real issue, but the
examples we have provided shows that there are many interesting cases in
which we need a fixed point that is neither the least nor the greatest one, and
standard inference systems are not able to provide such flexibility.
Our work starts from the operational models, closely related to each other,
introduced by Ancona and Zucca (2012, 2013) and Ancona (2013). As already
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discussed, these operational semantics introduce some flexibility for interpreting
predicates and functions recursively defined on non-well-founded data types.
The initial objective of our work was to provide a more abstract semantics for
such operational models, hence we developed a first model in (Ancona et al.,
2016) focused on this aim. However, the result was not satisfactory, since we
managed to capture the semantics of a restricted class of definitions, with a
model that was quite tricky.
Then, we decided to take a more abstract perspective, considering inference
systems as reference framework. In this context we discovered the notion of
coaxioms, that convinced us to be the right one. We proposed it in (Ancona
et al., 2017b) and discussed it in more detail in the present thesis.
In order to finely describe coaxioms, we have generalized the meta-theory of
inference systems by providing two equivalent semantics, one based on fixed
points in a complete lattice, and the other on the notion of proof tree. In the
former case, the semantics of an inference system with coaxioms is the greatest
fixed point of its corresponding one step inference operator, below the least
pre-fixed point containing the coaxioms; in the latter case, the standard notion
of proof tree for the coinductive case is generalized by requiring coaxioms to be
applicable ”at an infinite depth”.
More precisely, in order to define the model-theoretic semantics, we have
considered closure and kernel systems, usually defined only for the power-set
lattice, in the general context of complete lattices, proving some properties of
theirs. Then, we have studied in more detail pre-fixed and post-fixed points
of a monotone function on a complete lattice, that form a closure system and
a kernel system respectively. Using these notions we have managed to define
the bounded fixed point, that is the fixed point that captures the semantics of
inference systems with coaxioms.
From the proof-theoretic perspective, we have provided three different and
equivalent characterizations. All of them essentially impose a condition on
coinductive proof trees1 to be accepted. In other words, all these conditions
allows us to filter out undesired derivations. The first characterization requires
that each judgement in the tree is derivable with a well-founded proof tree
in the extended inference system (the inference system where coaxioms are
considered as axioms). The other two characterizations are based on the notion
of approximated proof tree of level n, that are well-founded proof trees in the
extended inference system, where coaxioms can only be used at depth greater
1 Here we mean proof trees valid for the coinductive interpretation, hence both well-founded
and non-well-founded proof trees.
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than n. The second proof-theoretic characterization requires all judgements in
the coinductive proof to have an approximated proof tree for each level.
The last characterization is quite different: it does not require any coinduc-
tive proof tree. The crucial notion here is that of (strong) approximating proof
sequence, that is a sequence of approximated proof trees of increasing level, hav-
ing an initial portion in common that grows with the level of the approximated
proof tree. The result is that, if we provide such a sequence for a judgement,
then it is acceptable. Indeed, we have defined a notion of limit for approximated
proof sequence and proved that this limit is a valid coinductive proof tree.
We have also developed proof techniques to reason with coaxioms, in par-
ticular we have defined the bounded coinduction principle, that generalizes
the standard coinduction principle, and allows us to prove completeness for a
definition. We have also provided a proof technique to prove soundness, based
on approximated proof trees and a reasoning by contraposition.
further work Starting from this thesis, in order to develop possible ex-
tensions and applications of coaxioms, we identify three main directions for
further investigations:
1. deepening the comprehension of coaxioms,
2. defining language constructs to support flexible (co)inductive definitions
of data types, predicates and functions,
3. and developing applications to model infinite behaviours of programs and
systems.
For what concerns the model, a first compelling direction for further develop-
ments is exploring other proof techniques (Hur et al., 2013) for coaxioms and
their mechanization in proof assistant. To this aim, it would be useful exploring
the relationship between coaxioms ad type theories, since several proof assistant
are based on such theories.
We will also try to investigate the dual to the notion studied here: one could
consider the least fixed point above the greatest post-fixed point contained
in the coaxioms, instead of the greatest fixed point below the least pre-fixed
point containing the coaxioms. In particular, it would be interesting studying
inference systems for which the two different semantics coincide, since in that
case we would get a generalization of the induction principle providing us with
a proof technique to show soundness.
An open problem concerning the interpretation generated by coaxioms is its
computability. It is quite obvious that in general this set cannot be computed,
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however it could be interesting studying conditions and/or restrictions that
ensure at least that this set is semi-decidable. To this aim it could be useful
trying to provide another proof-theoretic characterization based on partial proof
trees, that are proof trees with assumptions, and form a complete partial order.2
Another interesting development is to investigate a variant of the model able
to directly capture the definition of functions, rather than representing them
as functional relations. This would be relevant to more appropriately model
language constructs to support flexible (co)recursion in functional languages.
This variant could also imply a change of framework, moving from lattice theory
to domain or category theory, where the semantics of (co)recursive definitions of
functions is better supported. Therefore a deeper comparison between coaxioms
and category-theoretic or type-theoretic models could be useful.
Considering language support for flexible (co)induction and (co)recursion,
the first step would be providing a support for coaxioms to the logic paradigm.
As we have already noted, a logic program is much like an inference system,
hence the translation of coaxioms in this paradigm seems not to be too complex.
Indeed, we have already done some steps in this direction in (Ancona et al.,
2017a), where we have provided an extension to LP, defining both a declarative
and a sound operational semantics: the former is based on the bounded fixed
point, the latter on a combination of SLD and coSLD resolutions. We have also
implemented a prototype meta-interpreter in SWI-Prolog3.
Extending the notion of coaxioms to the setting of object-oriented and func-
tional paradigms is more challenging, due to the gap between the underlying
theories. Indeed, these paradigms deal with functions rather than relations, that
are, instead, the objects managed by inference systems with coaxioms; since
functions can be seen as particular relations, we can represent them in our
model, however we have always to ensure that the generated fixed point is
actually a function, and this is not always guaranteed.
For the object-oriented paradigm a starting point could be the revision of the
operational semantics of coFJ on the basis of the abstract model provided by
coaxioms; in particular to guarantee that the function denoted by a function
definition in coFJ is actually a fixed point of the induced monotone operator.
The extension to the functional paradigm is even more challenging: the model
does not directly support higher order functions, that are a key feature of
functional programming languages. Hence, to these aims, a deeper study of the
abstract model is surely required.
2 Special thanks go to Eugenio Moggi for his useful comments to highlight the importance of
computability issues and for his suggestions to start the development in this direction.
3 Available at http://www.disi.unige.it/person/AnconaD/Software/co-facts.zip
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Finally, starting from the example in Section 4.5.4, it could be interesting to
better study the capabilities of coaxioms to model non-termination. We have
already done a first step in this direction in (Ancona et al., 2017c), where we
apply the approach sketched in Section 4.5.4 to an imperative FJ-like language,
studying in particular application of proof techniques for coaxioms to prove the
soundness of predicates (such as typing relations) with respect to the operational
semantics.
A further extension of this application would be applying coaxioms to define
trace-based operational semantics (Nakata and Uustalu, 2009), that allows to
capture finer characterizations of the behaviour of non-terminating programs.
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